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ABSTRACT 
 
JEFFREY DIEBOLD: Financial and Health Security in Old Age: Three Essays  
(Under the direction of John Scott) 
 
 
This dissertation is composed of three essays that examine issues and policies related 
to the well-being of the elderly in the United States. Using a randomized control design, I 
demonstrate the relative strength of incentives structured as a credit as opposed to an 
economically equivalent deduction within the framework of a retirement-based annuitization 
decision. Next, I exploit the natural experiment provided by the establishment of Medicare 
Part D in 2006 to evaluate health-related outcomes affected by this policy change. I provide 
evidence that Medicare Part D resulted in a number of positive health-related outcomes 
among those Medicare beneficiaries without prescription drug coverage prior to enrolling in 
Part D. Finally, I test whether the financially literate are more likely to make decisions that 
minimize the risks to their financial security. The results from this analysis are decidedly 
mixed. Financially literate individuals do not, necessarily make better financial and 
investment related decisions but appear more active in the decision-making process. 
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CHAPTER 1 
CREDITS AND DEDUCTIONS: AN EXPERIMENTAL TEST OF THE RELATIVE 
STREGNTH OF ECONOMIC INCENTIVES 
 
Introduction 
Social policy in the United States has undergone an important transformation in 
recent decades as policymakers have increasingly employed the tax code to promote a broad 
range of social goals and policy objectives (Howard 1997; Howard 2007). This form of 
social policy is comprised of provisions within the tax code that provide credits, deductions 
or exclusions that serve as incentives for behaviors thought to socially desirable. Unlike the 
social policies such as Head Start, Medicare, or Temporary Assistance for Needy Families 
that are funded through direct expenditures and are, typically, administered by government 
agencies, these ―tax expenditures‖ represent foregone revenue resulting from those 
reductions in the tax liability of qualifying households. Tax expenditures provide an 
economic incentive to engage in the behaviors they subsidize by allowing the household to 
reduce their tax burden and increase their after-tax income.  
Among the largest of the tax expenditures in the tax code are the mortgage interest 
deduction, the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), and the exclusion of income contributed to 
individual pension plans. These provisions are designed to subsidize, respectively, home 
ownership, work (among low-income persons), and saving for retirement in an effort to 
encourage these behaviors. According to the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) (2010), the 
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revenue losses from individual households in 2010 due to these provisions within the tax 
code were $91 billion, $56 billion, and $105 billion, respectively.   
Just as it is important to study if conventional policies have their intended effect and 
how current practices can be improved upon for better outcomes, it is equally important to 
apply these same empirical questions to the study of tax expenditures. Currently, most 
research has been devoted to establishing whether these programs are effective at 
encouraging the behaviors they subsidize and the results from the empirical work in this field 
are decidedly mixed.  
The findings of this paper are intended to contribute to the debate over how best to 
encourage behavior through the tax code. Recognizing that the tax code is now indelibly 
linked to social policy in the United States, the benefits from such an analysis are twofold. 
First, this study will help determine whether tax credits may be more effective at increasing 
the rate at which individuals would engage in socially desirable behavior because, contrary to 
economic theory, experimental evidence indicates that individuals respond differently to 
alternative, yet economically equivalent, incentives. Second, this understanding will help 
establish how lawmakers can best apply the limited resources available to them. Meaning, if 
one type of tax expenditure is more effective at encouraging the behavior it is intended to 
subsidize, then by shifting resources into the most effective type of incentive policymakers 
can effectively and efficiently achieve their policy aims.  
Tax Expenditures, Social Policy, and Behavioral Models  
The earned income tax credit (EITC) provided $55 billion to 25.7 million working 
families with low-income in 2009 (JCT 2010). This provision within the tax code is currently 
the largest source of cash-assistance for the working poor and is the nation’s primary 
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antipoverty program (Gitterman 2010). Research has demonstrated that this program has 
been successful at increasing workforce participation among single mothers and reducing US 
poverty rates among the working poor (Eissa and Liebman 1996; Meyer and Rosenbaum 
2000; Sherman 2009; Ben-Shalom, Moffit, and Scholz 2011; Hotz and Scholz 2006).  
The mortgage interest rate deduction (MID) provided more than 34 million 
households with more than $91 billion worth of tax benefits in 2009 (JCT 2010). This 
subsidy is intended to promote homeownership which is thought to be associated with a 
number of positive externalities and socially beneficial outcomes. Despite being larger in 
terms of total benefit than the EITC, the empirical evidence indicates that this subsidy has 
had little to no effect on the rates of homeownership within the US. Glaeser and Shapiro 
(2004) estimate that a one percent increase in the subsidy rate is associated with only a .0009 
percent increase in the rate homeownership. In other words, the subsidy is going to people 
who would have engaged in the desired behavior even in the absence of the subsidy. 
The federal government also allows for deductions and exclusions for income 
invested in a defined contribution plans and individual retirement accounts. These provisions, 
referred to hereafter as exclusions for plan contributions (EPC), are intended to incentivize 
retirement saving and thereby improve financial security in retirement for those covered 
under qualifying plans. According to estimates from the Joint Committee on Taxation (2010), 
US workers were able to save $69 billion in tax liabilities through contributions to their 
pension plan in 2010. Contributions to these plans are typically tax deferred, meaning that 
individuals are allowed to exclude them from their taxable income throughout their working 
lives, but must eventually pay taxes on them and any investment earnings when they 
withdraw them. Here again, the empirical evidence indicates that the incentives embedded 
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within the tax code fails to encourage new retirement savings (Engen, Gale, and Scholz 1996; 
Gale and Scholz 1994). 
In summary, these examples taken from research on tax expenditures highlight the 
mixed success of social policies administered through the tax code. It is surprising, given the 
considerable loss of tax revenue, that the MID and EPC tax expenditures fail to encourage 
the desired behaviors. The failure of these deduction and exclusion provisions contrasts 
starkly with the apparent success of the less costly EITC. The existing literature analyzing 
the effects of tax expenditures has tended to focus, primarily, on whether a particular tax 
policy has an effect on individual behavior. By contrast, this analysis will attempt to 
understand why certain tax expenditures may be more effective than others at increasing the 
rate at which individuals engage in the subsidized behaviors. While there is no available 
literature on the topic known to this author, there is apparent interest in this line of research. 
William Gale (2011), recently testifying before the Senate Committee on Finance, advocated 
for the conversion of the EPC into a refundable tax credit in an effort to improve the 
incentives associated with retirement savings. The important implication underlying his 
testimony is that individuals may respond differently to similar incentives depending on how 
they are structured. According to economic theory, individuals should be indifferent between 
two options with equal expected values but individual economic behavior frequently deviates 
from the expectations of these models.  
In a field experiment comparing the relative strength of offering a credit (cash rebate) 
or economically equivalent matching contributions, Saez (forthcoming) found that the 
matching contributions were more effective at increasing enrollment in and contributions to 
an individual retirement account (IRA). The credit and match were set at rates such that the 
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out-of-pocket costs associated with any contributions were identical for individuals in each 
group. Those offered a credit were more likely to enroll in an IRA by roughly 5 percentage 
points and contributed $153 more to their accounts after enrolling. In a related study, Davis 
and Millner (2006) compared the effect of matches and credits as price-reduction strategies 
on consumer decisions. In this study, the researchers offered participants either a refund or a 
matching incentive to purchase chocolate bars. Those participants that were offered a 
matching incentive for the purchase of candy bars purchased significantly more candy bars 
than those offered an economically equivalent rebate.  
The evidence indicating that economic responses actually vary depending on the 
incentive structures has important implications for economic and social policy, including the 
subsidies provided by tax expenditures. If one form of tax expenditure is a more powerful 
incentive then the federal government may be able to restructure many of the existing tax 
expenditures to increase the economic behaviors they are designed to subsidize without 
increasing the present expenditure levels. This study intends to test this possibility by 
comparing the effect of a credit to that of a deduction with the expectation that offering a 
credit is a more effective means of motivating specific behaviors.      
Why Credits Might be More Effective 
Deductions, exclusions, and tax credits each reduce a qualifying household’s tax 
liability in an effort to incentivize specific behaviors, but they accomplish this goal through 
different mechanisms: deductions and exclusions result in a reduction a taxable income and 
credits reduce tax liability and increase after-tax income. Economic theory suggests that the 
manner in which those subsidies are delivered should not matter as long as each incentive has 
an identical effect on a household’s total income. The evidence from behavioral studies 
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indicates that individuals frequently violate this expectation and show that the strength of the 
incentive created by the subsidy of the different tax expenditures may depend on how that 
subsidy is delivered (Davis and Millner 2006; Saez Forthcoming). For example, while there 
is no evidence to suggest that the MID and EPC have encouraged the behaviors they 
subsidize, there is evidence that individuals have responded to other forms of similar 
incentives for these particular behaviors. A recent study by Goldman Sachs (2010) found that 
the first-time homebuyer’s tax credit had a significant impact on home sales in 2008 and 
2009. This temporary tax credit provided those purchasing their first home with a refundable 
tax credit of up to $8,000 and is estimated to have increased home values by 5 percent and to 
have led to 400,000 additional home purchases in 2009 (Goldman Sachs 2010). Matched 
contributions and matching rates also appear to have a significant effect on participation in 
and contributions to individual retirement accounts (Duflo, Gale, Liebman, Orszag, and Saez 
2006). However, the size of the effect of the Saver’s Tax Credit, a non-refundable tax credit 
that reduces the tax liability up to 50 percent of contributions to a defined contribution plan 
of qualifying households, appears to be small (Duflo. Orszag, Gale, Saez, and Liebman 
2007). The literature has established that economically equivalent incentives do not always 
elicit equal behavioral responses, but the evidence that credits are more effective than 
deductions or exclusions is merely suggestive. This analysis will attempt to test this 
possibility more directly but it is important, first, to explore the possible reasons why equally 
valued incentives may not elicit equal behavioral responses.    
The expectation in economic theory of equivalent behavioral responses to 
economically equivalent incentive schemes is predicated on the assumption that individual 
economic behavior and choices are the result of rational actors weighing the available 
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options carefully according to expected benefits and then choosing the option that will 
maximize their gain or utility. Under this framework, individuals are assumed to be 
indifferent between two options with equivalent expected benefits. Applying these principles 
to tax expenditures, the effect of the incentive on the willingness of individuals to engage in 
the behavior being subsidized should be equal when the benefits from the two different 
subsidies are equal. In other words, individuals should be equally motivated by two different 
tax incentives as long as the incentives are equal in value. So, for example, an individual 
considering whether to purchase a home should be equally motivated by a tax credit of 
$10,000 or being able to deduct up to $10,000 off their taxes over ten years assuming, for 
simplicity, zero inflation, zero interest rates, and a discount rate of zero. However, there are a 
number of reasons to doubt that equal incentives will produce equivalent responses.    
Deductions and exclusions such as the MID and EPC may have a higher compliance 
cost than tax credits like the EITC and compliance costs are thought to be an important 
determinant in the effect of a program (Bertrand, Mullainathan, and Shafir 2006). The 
complexity of the tax code confounds an easy estimation of one’s expected benefit and 
confusion or incomplete knowledge may prevent individuals from being able to incorporate 
any expected benefit from the subsidies into their economic decisions. As a recent article in 
the USA Today makes clear, there is general confusion, even among purported tax 
professionals about the difference between the marginal and effective tax rate.
1
 The article 
incorrectly claimed that workers receiving a pay raise may actually end up with less take-
home pay after being ―bump[ed] into the next tax bracket.‖ Survey evidence suggests that 
such confusion is widespread among the general population. Further, a study by Fuiji and 
                                                 
1
 The article was written by Gregory Connelly (2011) and the USA Today has since issued a correction.  
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Hawley (1988) found that a large portion of the population could not guess or correctly 
identify their marginal tax rate. Without this knowledge, individuals cannot accurately 
estimate the amount by which these subsidies reduce their annual tax liability. This also 
provides a reasonable explanation for why wage earners and those with positive taxable 
income do not bunch into kink points at the various income tax brackets (Saez 2010; Chetty 
and Saez 2009). This finding is true over time as well, even when the increase in the 
marginal rates have been large and stable (Saez 2010). While applying for the EITC does not 
depend on whether one itemizes their deductions or require meticulous record keeping, this 
program, like the MID and EPC, has multiple and complex eligibility requirements and 
benefit schedules. Survey results indicate that workers are aware of the existence of the EITC 
but are not knowledgeable with respect to the structure of the EITC (Phillips 2001; Romich 
and Weisner 2002; Smeeding, Phillips, and O’Conner 2000; Maag 2005). This might explain 
why wage earners fail to bunch around the kink points at the phase-in and phase-out ranges 
of the EITC benefit schedule (Saez 2010; Chetty and Saez 2009).  
The lack of a behavioral response to the MID and EPC tax subsidies may also be a 
function of the type of households that are able to make the most of these particular 
provisions. Deductions and exclusions reduce the amount income that falls under an 
individual’s marginal rate of taxation and, therefore, provide a larger benefit to higher 
income households that, typically, face higher marginal rates. As a result, these provisions 
provide only a small subsidy to the vast majority of income earners and a larger benefit to 
high-income households.
2
 The small subsidy implies that these programs provide only a 
weak incentive for engaging in the subsidized behavior. Moreover, a household can only 
                                                 
2
 In 2009, 80 percent of tax payers faced a marginal rate of taxation of 15 percent, the rate applied to income 
below  (Tax Policy Center 2011). http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxfacts/displayafact.cfm?Docid=262 
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claim benefits like the mortgage interest deduction if they itemize their deductions on their 
income tax returns. Tax filing data indicate that outside of the high-income earners, only a 
small minority of taxpayers itemize their deductions (Prante 2007). Almost all of the 
wealthy, however, do itemize their deductions and received a disproportionate share of the 
benefits from these subsidies. For example, in 2009, 69 percent of all the benefits from the 
MID went to the 20 percent of US households making more than $100,000 (Joint Committee 
on Taxation 2010).
3
 Higher income households may be predisposed to the types of behavior 
the government is attempting to encourage through these types of tax expenditures. This 
would help explain the imperceptible effect of these programs on the propensity of 
consumers to engage in the subsidized behaviors and would suggest that the these programs 
are functioning more as an unexpected reward for high-income households than as an 
incentive for these behaviors for those at lower points along the income distribution.  
Finally, behavioral responses to these tax subsidies may vary due to psychological 
biases such as prospect theory a descriptive framework of individual decision-making under 
risk and uncertainty developed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). One of the central tenets 
of this theory is that individuals tend to prefer a benefit that is certain over a larger benefit 
that is not certain. This tendency is referred to as the ―certainty effect‖ and may help explain 
why individuals tend to heavily discount future benefits, meaning that they value present 
benefits higher than future benefits (Laibson 1997). Indeed, research has shown that when 
given the choice between a larger benefit paid out over time and a smaller lump sum benefit, 
individuals tend to prefer the lump sum (Pleeter and Warner 2001; Loewenstein and Prelec 
                                                 
3
 http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/cpstables/032010/hhinc/toc.htm 
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1992). Researchers have defined this type of impatience as hyperbolic discounting (Laibson 
1997).  
The evidence establishing the certainty effect and hyperbolic discounting imply that 
deductions and exclusions may be less effective at incentivizing the behavior due to the 
uncertainty they engender. As Fuiji and Hawley (1998) demonstrated, many people are 
confused about their marginal tax rate which would complicate any effort on the part of the 
individual to estimate the actual size of any benefit they might expect from any one particular 
deduction or exclusion. Even well-informed individuals will have to account for an uncertain 
future (e.g. mortality or income level) in their estimation of the present value of any total 
benefit they might expect to receive from, say, the MID. For example, an individual must 
incorporate the probability that he/she will make enough in the future to justify itemizing 
their deductions, accurately forecast future rate of taxation they may face, and accurately 
forecast the value of any other deductions they intend to claim in the future.
4
 These factors 
introduce variation and uncertainty into expected present value of tax deductions, a problem 
that not shared by tax credits that reduce a tax bill dollar-for-dollar and may even be 
refundable, meaning that the household is paid the residual amount of the credit after their 
tax liability has been reduced to $0. 
Finally, the ability to structure benefits from a credit as an immediate windfall may 
also make credits a more effective incentive than the stream of benefits typically provided by 
deductions and exclusions. For example, the first-time buyer tax credit may have be more 
effective at increasing the number of homes purchased in the U.S. than the MID because it 
                                                 
4
 Individuals would need to know the value of any other deductions because the value of any one deduction is 
not simply the value of the deduction multiplied by the marginal tax rate, it is equivalent to its share of all 
deductions multiplied by the average tax rate on all of the deducted income. This is true because all deductions 
are not factored in any particular order.  
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provided homebuyers with a one-time, fixed windfall rather than a stream of uncertain 
benefits issued over time. In a natural experiment involving substantial sums of money, 
Warner and Pleeter (2001) demonstrate the value that individuals place a large premium on 
the present gains. They illustrate the behavioral tendency towards hyperbolic discounting and 
show that individuals overwhelming prefer a smaller immediate to a larger gain paid out over 
time. The idea that individuals value something they can obtain immediately is related to the 
certainty effect because delaying an outcome is equivalent to making it uncertain. The effect 
of having something with certainty and having something immediately simply reinforce one 
another and weight the likelihood in favor of a credit being a stronger incentive than a 
deduction.   
This study expects to find that a credit is a more powerful incentive for encouraging 
specific behaviors. Therefore, it is expected that the rates of annuitization will be higher 
among those offered a credit than an actuarially equivalent deduction.  
Hypothesis 1: Participants will be more likely to select an annuity when receiving a 
credit versus a deduction with an equal expected value.    
Hypothesis 2: Participants will be more likely to select an annuity when receiving a 
credit even when the expected value of the deduction exceeds that of the credit.   
Why Annuities 
This study uses the decision to purchase an annuity as the context in which to analyze 
whether and how individuals respond differently to equivalent economic incentives. The 
incentives in this study are designed to replicate existing tax expenditure policies but because 
the results are derived from a game-based computer simulation, this study is limited in what 
it can say about the effect that these incentives might have on actual annuitization behavior. 
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However, there were important reasons behind the decision to base the experiment on the 
annuitization decision.   
First, according to the standard life-cycle model, individuals would realize significant 
welfare gains were they to annuitize some, or all of their retirement savings (Yaari 1965; 
Mitchell 2001; Dushi and Webb 2004; Mitchell, Poterba, Warshawsky, and Brown 1999; 
Davidoff, Brown, and Diamond 2005). Despite the theoretical and estimable gains that 
economic theory and literature suggest might flow from such a decision, very few individuals 
elect to annuitize their assets (Investment Company Institute 2011; Mottola and Utkus 2007). 
For this reason, it is the type of economic behavior that policymakers may have an interest in 
subsidizing. In fact, legislation was introduced before Congress in 2009 that would have 
modified the tax code and established a new tax expenditure that would have allowed 
individuals to exclude 50 percent of any income from an annuity contract.
5
  
Second, a growing number of researchers have used games to simulate the 
annuitization decision within an experimental setting to study various dimensions of the 
annuitization decision as well as various behavioral biases that violate or confirm basic 
economic theories and expectations. Two such studies were conducted recently by Agnew, 
Anderson, Gerlach, and Szykman (2008) and Gazzale and Walker (2009). Agnew et al 
(2008) found that the annuitization decision is sensitive to positive and negative framing. 
That is, individuals were exposed to information highlighting the benefits of annuities 
(positive framing), they were more inclined to purchase them than those exposed information 
highlighting the risks associated with them (negative framing). Gazzale and Walker (2009) 
found that individuals were more likely to purchase an annuity when their benefits were 
                                                 
5
 See H.R. 2748, The Retirement Security Needs Lifetime Pay Act of 2009. 
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specified as a stream of payments rather than a lump-sum prior to playing the game, implying 
that individuals anchor themselves to a specific way of thinking about their benefits and are 
more likely to annuitize because an annuity reinforces their original conceptualization of 
their benefits. They also found evidence indicating that the annuization decision is negatively 
affected by the sequential nature of the risk associated with survival (survival to period 15 
require survival to period 14, which requires survival to period 13, and so forth) to which the 
stream of benefits from an annuity are linked.  
This study will borrow the relevant game design of these previous studies in an effort 
to determine whether individual behavior deviates from the expectations of common 
economic models and offer ideas about how policy might be better designed to exploit these 
tendencies.   
Data and Methods  
Unlike many other types of programs and policies, there is a limited number of means 
by which tax expenditures may be implemented through the tax code (credit, deduction, or 
exclusion), yet little is known about the relative effectiveness of each type of expenditure. It 
is possible that the failure or success of these different provisions is a function of how the 
incentives are structured. Using an experimental design, this analysis will test whether the 
effect of a tax benefit depends on how it is structured. This study helps establish whether tax 
expenditures are incentivizing individuals to initiate certain behaviors rather than simply 
rewarding individuals for behavior they would have otherwise engaged in the absence of an 
incentive. 
The experiment was designed as a game that simulates one of the many economic 
decisions confronting those entering retirement: whether to insure against the risk of 
  
14 
 
 
outliving their assets (longevity risk) by purchasing an annuity with a portion of the account 
balance each player was given at the start of the game. Individuals were randomly assigned 
to receive incentives modeled after the type of tax expenditures typically used to subsidize 
socially desirable economic behavior: tax credits and tax deductions. The purpose of the 
incentives was to encourage annuitization within the game but the research aim is to study 
whether and how rates of annuitization vary between individuals assigned to the different 
treatment groups, when the value of the incentives are equal.  
The rates of annuitization are compared between three mutually exclusive groups to 
determine 1) whether tax subsidies can increase the rates of annuitization among individuals 
and 2) whether those offered a tax credit were more likely to annuitize than those offered the 
tax deduction. 
Game Structure 
To test the hypotheses, study participants played a computer-based game and were 
randomly assigned to either condition A (Credit), B (Equal Deduction), or C (Larger 
Deduction). Their assignment to either A, B, or C determined the type incentive they were 
offered to purchase an annuity but otherwise, the game was identical across conditions.  
The participants were then informed of the rules of the game. They were told that 
would have to make decisions related to their account before the game began and that once 
made, these decisions would be binding throughout the game.
6
 They were informed that they 
would begin the game with $20,000 in their account and that they were to ―live off‖ this 
money throughout the game. They were then told that their compensation for participating 
would be determined by the balance in their account when they exit the game. The higher 
                                                 
6
 They were binding because we wanted to make sure that the annuitization decision was affected only by the 
incentive offered and not by the changes in the account balance due to, say, market losses.  
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their account balance when their game ended, the higher their compensation.  It was then 
explained that the game would take place of multiple periods, and that in each period, $3,000 
would be deducted from their accounts, an amount set to represent cost of living expenses. 
They were then told that they would have opportunity to invest their funds in three different 
investment options. They were then informed that game would end if they ran out of money 
in their account or if they fail to ―survive‖ to the next period.  
Participants then learned the parameters determining survival which was determined 
randomly. The computer performed this function automatically by generating a random 
number between 1 and 18. Individuals with a value larger than the specified number survived 
to the next period. The value necessary to survive increased with each period, so the 
likelihood of survival declined over time. In each subsequent stage the value needed to 
survive increased by one. For example, an individual needed a value of four or higher to 
survive to the second stage and then a value of five or higher to survive to the third stage, a 
value of six in order to survive to the fourth stage, and so forth. Individuals were able to see 
the conditional probabilities of their survival to a given period in the ―life table‖ provided to 
them at the beginning of the game.     
Individuals were then given detailed information about the investment options in the 
game. They had the option of investing some or all of their money in (1) a fictional stock 
market, (2) purchasing an annuity to help offset their $3,000 per-period costs of living 
expenses, or (3) leaving their money in their account or some combination of the available 
options. The cost of the annuity was $13,110 and the amount of the per-period annuity 
payment was $2,000 (applied to the account balance). Returns in the stock market would be 
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due entirely to chance and any remaining amount they chose not to invest from their account 
would not gain or lose value except for the automatic deduction of the cost of living.  
On this same screen individuals could elect to purchase an annuity but depending on 
the group to which the participant was assigned, individuals received different information 
regarding the purchase of the annuity. Individuals assigned to the credit group would receive 
a credit of $3,277 applied towards their account balance if they purchased an annuity. Those 
that were assigned to the deduction group would see their cost of living reduced by $500 in 
each period if they purchased an annuity (Equation 1). Those that were assigned to the group 
offered the deduction that was larger than the credit were told that their cost of living would 
be reduced by $875 in each period if they purchased the annuity (Equation 2). The 
individuals indicated whether they wanted to purchase the annuity by answering ―yes‖ (or 
―no‖) to the question: ―Would you like to purchase the annuity?‖ The expected value of the 
deduction is given by the following equation: 
  (              )   ∑ (       )        
 
              Eq. 1 
  (               )   ∑ (       )        
 
             Eq. 2 
where p is equal to the conditional probability of surviving to time period t.  
The deduction is intended to reduce the per-period ―cost of living‖ of the participant 
just as tax deductions reduce the annual costs associated with the behaviors they subsidize. 
The values of the deductions were set to equal roughly 
 
 
 and 
 
 
 of the per-period cost of living 
in the game for the group and offered the equivalent and larger deductions, respectively. 
These values are, admittedly, arbitrary but these types of simplifications are unavoidable in a 
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game simulating life experiences.
7
 The total value of the deduction for the game was set to 
equal that of the credit after being weighted by the survival probabilities.  
Under this framework the deduction represents a decrease in the per-period cost-of-
living for the individual and the credit represents a one-time benefit issued in the period that 
the annuity was purchased. The game parameters with respect to the treatment conditions are 
intended to capture how each of these tax expenditures might operate in the real-world. 
While some tax expenditures can be claimed on an annual basis such as the EITC, the focus 
of this study is limited to the one-time credits. I structured the credit and deduction as such in 
order to heighten the contrast between the two as well as to simplify, as a practical matter, 
the operation of the game.   
After the participant decides whether to purchase the annuity and how much to invest 
in the stock market, the game begins. Once they have made their annuitization and 
investment decisions, nothing more is required of the participant as the game proceeds 
automatically from period to period until the individual either runs out of money or exits 
when the randomly generated survival number is insufficiently large.  Once the game is over, 
the amount remaining in the participant’s account is used to determine their compensation for 
playing the game.  Individuals were paid either $2, $5, or $10. They received $2 for exiting 
the game with a negative balance, $5 for exiting the game with a positive balance but below 
starting amount, and $10 for exiting the game with more than their the starting balance. After 
the participants finished playing the game, they filled out a brief survey that collected 
                                                 
7
 The value was selected primarily because it was the mid-point for acceptable range of possible values. The 
value had to be less than $1,000 and more than $0. This restriction ensures that individuals that purchase an 
annuity will still lose money from their account over time (Cost of Living = 3000 – 2000 – 500 = 500). This 
was to ensure that the project remained within the budget by not paying out too much too often to the 
participants.  
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demographic information and other data relevant to this study. Individuals are asked about 
their gender, age, race, marital status, employment status, education, and household size. 
They were also asked to provide information with respect to their primary pension plan and a 
question intended to elicit their level of risk aversion. The risk aversion question was a 
modified version of the same measure taken from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS).
8
 
After the individual finished filling out the survey information, they had concluded the study 
and they were given their compensation.   
Participants consisted of 145 individuals from the Wake County jury pool in Raleigh, 
North Carolina. These individuals within the jury pool were selected randomly from country 
residents who were either licensed drivers or registered voters, or both. Those county 
residents that are excluded from jury duty include those individuals that are less than 18 
years old, those that have served as a juror in the previous two years, those that do not speak 
English, felons that have not had their citizenship restored and those who are not physically 
or medically competent. Those individuals called for jury duty in the months between August 
2011 and November 2012 were solicited to participate in this game as they waited in the jury 
lounge in the Wake County Courthouse in downtown Raleigh. The game was set up on one 
or more computers in the jury lounge. Those that agreed to participate were seated at one of 
the available computers to play the game. 
There is no way to be sure that the sample size in this analysis is sufficiently large to 
justify claims of significance but a larger sample size is preferable, especially when the 
                                                 
8
 The risk aversion question asks the respondent to answer the following question: Suppose that you are the only 
income earner in the family. Your doctor recommends that you move because of allergies, and you have to 
choose between two possible jobs. The first would guarantee your current total family income for life. The 
second is possibly better paying, but the income is also less certain. There is a 50-50 chance the second job 
would double your total lifetime income and a 50-50 chance that it would cut it by a third. Which job would you 
take - the first job or the second job? This question is nearly identical to the HRS version. 
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treatment effects are thought to be small. As many participants as could be afforded were 
included in the study. Obviously, more participants are desirable but the group means 
appeared to have stabilized by the end of the data collection.  
Estimation Methods 
This analysis relies on two types of analysis: a two sample t-test and ordinary least-
squares regression (OLS). The outcome in each of these analyses is a dichotomous variable 
indicating whether or not individuals made the decision to annuitize. The variables of interest 
are the dichotomous variables indicating whether the individual was assigned to the group 
offered a credit or an economically equivalent deduction and the dichotomous variable 
indicating whether the individual offered a credit or the group offered an economically larger 
deduction. These variables are analyzed separately.  
T-tests are common with randomized designs but randomization creates only the 
expectation of equivalence between groups to which participants are assigned. Ordinary 
least-squares regression is used to control for differences that may exist between the groups 
across the demographic and control measures collected in the survey portion of the study. 
Because the outcome is dichotomous, the regression analysis is a linear probability model. A 
linear probability model with robust standard errors was used as opposed to a non-linear 
model to ease the comparison of the t-test and regression results.
 9
  
Descriptive Statistics 
 The summary statistics in Table 1 highlight some important aspects of the sample of 
game participants. What stands out most among the characteristics of the participants in this 
study is that an overwhelming majority of the sample had completed college. The highly 
                                                 
9
 Robust standard errors were used to account for heteroscedasticity in residuals.  
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educated sample reflects, in part, the population of Wake County. According to the Census 
Bureau, almost half of the residents in the county have a bachelor’s degree compared with 
one quarter of the North Carolina population statewide.
10
 Having a college education may 
also be associated with being a licensed driver or a registered voter, the pre-requisites for jury 
duty selection in the state. Finally, those that attended college may have been more willing to 
participate in a study linked with a local university. The relatively large number of college 
graduates in the study may limit the generalizability of these findings but jury pools are the 
easiest way to get access to a variety of potential participants. However, the more highly 
educated are more likely to have access to and participate in defined contribution plans 
(Engen, Gale, Scholz, Bernheim, and Slemrod 1994; Benjamin 2003). Therefore, the 
annuitization framework of this analysis may be more relevant to this segment of the 
population than to the general public. In sum, the benefit of having access to a broad range of 
individuals randomly sampled from the local population is strongly preferable to sampling 
undergraduates or employees of a particular firm, practices common among this type of 
experimental work but there are important differences between the sample and general 
population.  
A majority of the sample are white and between the ages of 30 and 49. A large 
fraction of the participants are married, in the labor force, and covered by a pension which is 
not surprising given that highly educated individuals are over-represented in this sample. 
Most of those with a pension are covered by a 401(k), the predominant form of pension in the 
private sector (Department of Labor, 2010).     
Results 
                                                 
10
 http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/37/37183.html  
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 Figure 1 displays the levels of annuitization for each of the groups in this analysis. 
Clearly, annuitization was a popular option within the game. The high rates of annuitization 
across each of the groups stand in stark contrast to the low levels of demand in the actual 
annuity market in the United States. However, according to data from the American Council 
of Life Insurers (2011), the amount Americans invest in individual annuity contracts has 
increased over the past few years but the current demand is still well below what economic 
theory would predict (Yaari 1965; Mitchell 2001; Dushi and Webb 2004; Mitchell, Poterba, 
Warshawsky, and Brown 1999; Davidoff, Brown, and Diamond 2005). While this is an 
interesting and unexpected finding, the absolute levels of annuitization are not as relevant as 
are the relative rates of annuitization between the each of the credit and deduction conditions.  
According to the data, a majority of those assigned to the credit condition and a 
substantial minority of those assigned to the deduction conditions opted to annuitize a portion 
of their account balance. Roughly 63 percent of those assigned to the credit condition 
annuitized their assets compared with 42 percent of those assigned to the credit-equivalent 
deduction condition and 43 percent of those assigned to the larger deduction condition.   
This study poses two questions: First, is there a significant difference in the rate of 
annuitization across the groups assigned to receive a credit and those assigned to receive an 
economically equivalent deduction? Second, is there a significant difference in the rate of 
annuitization across the groups assigned to receive a credit and those assigned to receive 
deduction that economically larger than that of the credit? The results from the pairwise 
comparisons are displayed in Table 2. 
Compared with the deduction group, those offered the credit were more likely to 
purchase the annuity. This was true regardless of whether the expected value deduction was 
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actuarially equivalent to the credit or whether the expected value of the deduction was larger 
than the credit. Being offered a credit increased the likelihood that an individual purchased 
an annuity by 21 percentage points over an actuarially equivalent deduction and 20 points 
over a deduction with a larger expected value. This change represents roughly a 50 percent 
increase in the rate at which individuals engaged in the subsidized behavior by simply 
moving from a deduction to a credit. The differences in the rates of annuitization between the 
credit group and each of the deduction groups were statistically significant at the .05 level. 
While randomization provides the expectation of equivalence across the credit and 
deduction groups but it does not guarantee that there will be no measurable differences 
between the groups, especially in smaller sample sizes like those used in this analysis 
According to summary statistics in Table 1 there do appear to be some important differences 
across the credit and deduction groups. The credit group has a higher proportion of females 
and married participants than either of the deductions groups. The participants in the group 
offered the deduction with an economically equivalent credit tended to be less risk averse 
than any of the other groups and were less likely to be covered by a pension than participants 
in the other groups. To control for the effect these differences may have, these measures were 
included as control variables in a regression analysis comparing the rates of annuitization 
across the different groups. The results of this analysis are provided in Table 4.    
 The coefficients from the regression analysis indicate that the difference in the 
estimated effect of the credit relative to the deduction remains even after controlling for the 
differences between the two groups. The results from the first column compare the effect of 
being assigned to the credit condition on the likelihood of annuitization relative to those 
assigned to the actuarially equivalent deduction condition. The parameter of interest is on the 
  
23 
 
 
variable Credit & Equal Deduction which is variable indicating treatment assignment. This 
coefficient .27 which indicates that being assigned to the credit condition increases the rate of 
annuitization by 27 percentage points over being assigned to the actuarially fair deduction 
condition. This estimate is statistically significant and larger than the difference in the group 
means estimated for each group (Table 2). The second parameter of interest is the variable 
Credit & Larger Deduction which indicates whether an individual was assigned to the group 
offered the credit condition or the group offered the deduction with an actuarially larger 
value than the credit. Here again, the effect is positive, statistically significant and larger than 
the difference than the group means estimated in Table 2. The larger coefficients for the 
treatment effects suggest that the effect was suppressed by one or more of the variables 
omitted from a simple t-test of group means.          
Discussion 
The findings from this study clearly demonstrate that an incentive structured to 
resemble a credit is a more powerful incentive for encouraging a specific economic behavior 
than one designed as a deduction. This fact remains true even when the expected value of the 
deduction is larger than the credit. These results comport with the stylized facts about the 
measureable effects of the EITC on labor force participation and the lack of an empirical 
relationship between the MID and EPC on the economic behaviors they are intended to 
subsidize. 
The types of tax subsidies analyzed in this experiment are important vehicles by 
which policymakers implement social welfare policies. In fact, spending on tax expenditures 
has grown at a rate comparable to direct spending programs over the past few decades 
(Howard 1997).  At a point in time when policymakers are looking to trim long-term deficits, 
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understanding how these incentives can be structured to maximize their effectiveness and 
make the most efficient use of public resources is paramount from a policy perspective.  
While this project focuses on the annuities specifically, the behavioral responses to 
the various incentive structures that underlie the reasons for these differences are relevant to 
a wider range of activities. The tax code is replete with rules granting favorable (and 
unfavorable) tax treatment to specific behaviors that the Congress intends to foster and 
sustain. If the purpose of tax expenditure subsidies is to increase the rate at which individuals 
engage the behavior that these policies are intended to subsidize, then the evidence from this 
analysis would suggest that the focus should shift away from deductions and exclusions and 
towards refundable tax credits as the results suggest that the government could get a larger 
behavioral response from a credit than it could with a higher valued, and more expensive, 
deduction. Opportunities to get more for less are rare, but with respect to tax expenditures, it 
appears possible.  
Future studies looking at this issue may check to determine whether these results are 
robust when applied in a field experiment on annuitization and other types of economic 
behavior. It is also important to establish whether the strength of the incentive from a credit 
is moderated by the credit design—namely, whether the credit is refundable or non-
refundable. In their review a tax credit designed to encourage retirement saving (the Saver’s 
Credit), Duflo et al. (2006) conclude that complex design combined with non-fundability 
may explain the limited success of this incentive. Their work establishes that simply 
providing a credit as opposed to a deduction or exclusion will not ensure the success of the 
incentive, but that the structure of the credit matters. It would be useful for future work in 
this field to distinguish between more and less successful credit designs.  
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics  
 
Credit Group 
Deduction Group                         
(Actuarially 
Equivalent) 
Deduction Group                                 
(More Valuable) 
Fraction Male 0.37 0.42 0.56 
Fraction White 0.79 0.79 0.73 
Fraction Married  0.82 0.66 0.67 
Fraction Employed Full-time 0.78 0.76 0.85 
Size of Household  2.99 2.84 2.77 
Age  
   18-29 0.09 0.05 0.05 
30-39 0.24 0.13 0.41 
40-49 0.35 0.37 0.33 
50-59 0.22 0.21 0.13 
60+ 0.1 0.24 0.08 
Education 
   Some High School 0 0 0 
High School 0.03 0.05 0 
Some College  0.21 0.21 0.26 
College or More 0.76 0.74 0.74 
Fraction with a Pension 0.82 0.71 0.85 
Fraction with Risk Averse 0.72 0.55 0.71 
Fraction with a DC Plan 0.63 0.53 0.67 
    N =  68 38 39 
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Table 2: Pairwise Comparisons of Annuitization Rates 
Pairwise Comparison 
Hypothesized Difference in Rates of 
Annuitzation 
Actual 
Difference  
p-value  
Credit and Equal Deduction Avg(Credit) - Avg(Eq. Deduct) > 0 21.1 0.036** 
Credit and Larger Deduction Avg(Credit) - Avg(Lrg. Deduct) > 0 19.6 0.049** 
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Table 3: Comparison of Annuitization Rates by Group using OLS 
 
 
Outcome: Annuity (Yes=1; No=0) 
Credit (1) & Equal Deduction(0) 0.267** 
 
 
-2.44 
 Credit (1) & Larger Deduction(0) 
 
0.217** 
  
-2.02 
Married 0.092 0.134 
 
-0.69 -1.12 
Risk Averse  -0.213* -0.143 
 
(-1.93) (-1.23) 
Has a Pension Plan -0.072 0.144 
 
(-0.52) -1.11 
Constant 0.537*** 0.322* 
 
-2.73 -1.67 
N 91 95 
* p<.10 ** p<.05 ***p<.01 
  
The t-scores are in parentheses. 
 
Figure 1: 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE EFFECTS OF MEDICARE PART D ON HEALTH OUTCOMES AND 
EXPENDITURES 
 
Introduction  
In 2003, the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act 
(MMA) established an optional prescription drug component within the Medicare program, 
known as Part D. This new program was effective on January 1, 2006, at which point all 
Medicare-eligible individuals (those aged 65 and older or disabled) had the option of 
obtaining prescription drug coverage through Medicare. For the many Medicare beneficiaries 
without an existing prescription drug plan, Part D represented a unique opportunity to obtain 
prescription drug coverage. For others with existing prescription drug coverage, Part D 
represented an alternative to their current plan. Using two treatment groups composed of 
separate samples of Part D enrollees—those without prior coverage and those replacing their 
existing coverage with a Part D plan—and a control group of Medicare beneficiaries that had 
and maintained their pre-existing coverage, this analysis will estimate the effect of 
prescription drug coverage and Part D on the health and health care utilization among 
Medicare beneficiaries using a quasi-experimental research design.  
Medicare Part D  
The passage of MMA marked the largest expansion of Medicare since the program 
was created in 1965 and was widely viewed as a response by lawmakers to the rising demand 
for, and increasing cost of, prescription drug therapy. From 1994 to 2004, the price of 
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prescription drugs in the U.S. had increased an average of 8.3 percent per year, more than 
triple the average annual rate of inflation (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2005). Over same time 
span, the average number of prescriptions taken by Americans increased from 7.9 to 12.3 
(Kaiser Family Foundation 2005). According to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services, just prior to the implementation of Part D, the U.S. spent $201.7 billion dollars on 
prescription drugs in 2005, marking a 177 percent increase in prescription expenditure over 
the previous decade.
11
 As Figure 1 illustrates, the cost of prescription drugs increased at the 
fastest rate in recent years compared to other major medical expenditures.  
A primary objective of the Part D program was to reduce the costs associated with 
prescription drug therapy through the expansion of affordable access to drug coverage. High 
prices made prescription drug therapy cost prohibitive for many of those without access to 
prescription drug coverage or with less comprehensive forms of coverage. Prior to the 
establishment of Part D, between 20 and 30 percent of Medicare recipients lacked any 
prescription drug coverage (Safran et al. 2005; Neuman et al. 2007; Levy and Weir 2007). 
Despite their lack of drug coverage, more than one-third of these individuals reported taking 
five or more prescription medications in 2003. Uncovered Medicare recipients were more 
likely to have not filled a prescription, skipped doses, or taken smaller doses in an effort to 
defray their prescription costs than were those with coverage (Safran et al. 2005). Part D was 
an effort to reduce these forms of rationing and improve access to prescription drugs to these 
uncovered and under-covered individuals.  
The rate at which Medicare recipients without prior coverage enrolled in the Part D 
program suggests that their coverage status may have been the result of market exclusion 
                                                 
11
 These figures represent the author’s calculation using expenditure data 1995 to 2005 provided by the Centers 
for Medicare and Medicaid Services. The amounts are expressed in constant 2005 dollars.  
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rather than low demand. Approximately 61 percent of those without coverage in 2005, the 
year before Part D was implemented, enrolled in the program, reducing the proportion of 
uncovered Medicare beneficiaries from 33 to roughly 8 percent (Neuman et al. 2007; Heiss, 
McFadden, and Winter 2007). While no formal study shows why these individuals lacked 
prescription drug coverage prior to Part D, one can speculate that many were uncovered due 
to exogenous constraints such as a lack of a retirement health benefit and/or the high price of 
supplemental prescription drug coverage. Results from this study indicate that among the 
uncovered, those individuals who reported taking prescriptions regularly were most likely to 
enroll in a Part D plan when they became available. The enrollment of these individuals in 
Part D signifies the success of this program at reducing some of the barriers posed by costs 
and limited access to the drug insurance market. 
There is also evidence to suggest that Part D plans were an attractive alternative for 
many of those individuals with preexisting coverage.  Neuman et al. (2007) found that 46 
percent of those enrolling in Medicare Part D in 2006 had coverage from another source in 
2005. Again, one can only speculate as the exact reason but results from this study indicate 
that those with plans that covered less of their total prescription costs were more likely to 
substitute their existing coverage for a Part D plan. This finding implies that, for these 
individuals, plans within the Part D program were most likely to be less costly and/or more 
comprehensive.  
Regardless of the group-specific reasons, the decision of the uncovered and covered, 
to enroll in a Part D plan may be interpreted as the revealed preference of the individuals 
within each group. Under this framework, the Part D enrollment decision represents the 
individual’s maximization decision and allows for the expectation that their coverage will 
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result in positive health outcomes for both groups. In this paper, I estimate the effect of Part 
D prescription drug coverage on the health and health care utilization of individuals within 
each group.   
Medicare Part D: The Natural Experiment  
The establishment of the Part D program is useful for this analysis because of two key 
features.  First, the establishment of the Part D program represented an exogenous shock to 
the availability of prescription drug insurance for Medicare beneficiaries. This change 
created a natural experiment that may be employed to control for possible selection bias and 
isolate the effect of Part D drug coverage on the health-related outcomes of those enrolled in 
the program. This study will use the variation in the availability of drug coverage generated 
by the establishment of Part D to analyze the effect of this program on health care utilization 
and health outcomes of two distinct groups of Part D enrollees: (1) those without prior drug 
coverage and (2) those substituting their existing coverage for a Part D drug plan. Each group 
will be used to estimate two similar, but separate treatment effects. The first group (Group 1) 
will be used to estimate the effect of prescription drug coverage by comparing those who 
signed up for coverage in contrast to those who had drug coverage prior to the establishment 
of Part D and maintained that drug coverage through 2008. The second group (Group 2) will 
be used to estimate the effect of the Part D program on the health-related outcomes employed 
in this study by comparing those who switched into Part D with those with retained their 
previous coverage. A third group of individuals that had and maintained their existing 
coverage from a private source will be used as a control group in a difference-in-difference 
research design. This technique imposes few key identifying assumptions and allows for a 
causal interpretation of the relationships found in the data.  
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Second, detailed data on the prescription drug coverage, health status, and health care 
utilization of individuals in each of these groups are available from the Health and 
Retirement Study (HRS), a longitudinal data set covering a large sample of those eligible for 
and enrolled in Medicare and Part D. Most importantly, the data employed in this analysis 
were collected in this survey both before and after the introduction of the Part D program 
allowing for difference-in-difference estimation. These data will be used to determine 
individual assignment to the treatment and control groups and to estimate the effect of the 
Part D program on the health outcomes available in the HRS.  Assignment to the three 
groups—two treatment and one control group—will be determined by combining data on the 
respondents’ prescription drug coverage status 2004, 2006 and 2008, two years prior to the 
implementation of Part D, and up to 3 years afterwards.         
This study will include new as well as previously examined health-related outcomes 
from a data set that has not yet been applied to the analysis of the Part D program. In doing 
so, this paper makes two new contributions to the literature.  
First, this analysis will argue that the previous study attempting to estimate the effect 
of Part D prescription drug coverage on health by Kaestner and Khan (2010) obscured this 
relationship by looking for health improvements using a composite index of physical 
limitations and a research design with limited statistical power. The medications most 
frequently prescribed to Part D enrollees are taken for preventative purposes with the 
intention of mitigating the health risks and symptoms associated with chronic health 
conditions (Hargrave, Hoadley, Cubanski, and Neuman 2009). Therefore, individual health is 
more likely to respond by stabilizing health declines rather than resulting in actual 
improvements. This paper argues that, given the advanced age of the elderly, the disability 
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status of the nonelderly eligible for Medicare, and the types of prescriptions most frequently 
taken by Part D enrollees, it is unlikely that increased access to prescription therapy through 
Part D would result in physical or functional improvements. Any health effect of Part D, 
therefore, is likely to operate through the mitigation of the current health declines rather than 
actual improvements in health. For this reason, this study will introduce a new measure of 
health changes, self-reported health declines, into the study of the health effects of Part D 
that is intended to more accurately capture and model the relationship between prescription 
drug therapy and individual health. In addition, the use of a weak instrument in the quasi-
experimental analysis of Kaestner and Kahn (2010), which may have inflated the standard 
errors in the authors’ two-stage least squares regression model, likely prevented them from 
detecting small effect sizes, a fact acknowledged by the authors. Again, the advanced age and 
physical condition of Medicare recipients may foreclose on the possibility that Part D would 
have a large effect on their health. Smaller effect sizes would have been imperceptible and 
mistaken for a lack of a significant effect in their analysis. This analysis will attempt to 
provide a more complete and precise estimation of the health effects of the Part D program 
using a new research design and by re-examining and expanding upon the health outcomes 
studied by Kaestner and Khan (2010).  
Second, this will be the first study to isolate two distinct treatment effects on the 
health and health care utilization among Part D enrollees: (1) the effect of prescription drug 
coverage and (2) the effect of Part D program. The difference between these two effects is 
subtle but important. The first effect captures the Part D program’s impact on those without 
prior prescription drug coverage (Group 1). The second distinguishes the effect that Part D 
has had on those who enrolled in the program with prior prescription drug coverage (Group 
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2). The existing literature has focused on the effect of Part D on the Group 1 and, until this 
point, has yet to explore the nature of the relationship between Part D and the health-related 
outcomes for Group 2. In order to understand the range of possible treatment effects resulting 
from the establishment of Part D, it is necessary to isolate and analyze each of the 
subpopulations enrolled in the program.  
Literature Review   
Though much research has been devoted to understanding and estimating the effect of 
health insurance on individual health and health care utilization, the study of prescription 
drug insurance on these outcomes has not garnered nearly as much attention. This 
discrepancy is likely due to the relatively recent emergence of prescription drug therapy as a 
primary treatment modality and the fact that prescription drug benefits are often subsumed 
within comprehensive health insurance plans. The available research in the prescription drug 
coverage field consistently demonstrates that obtaining prescription drug coverage leads to 
an increase in prescription drug use and declines in out-of-pocket prescription drug 
expenditures. There is no available evidence to suggest that prescription drug coverage 
results in improved health outcomes.  
Health Insurance  
 The only large-scale randomized experiment to study the effects of health insurance 
coverage on individual health status and demand for medical services occurred in 1974 under 
the RAND Health Insurance Experiment (HIE). In the HIE, individuals were randomly 
assigned to different levels of insurance coverage that were differentiated by the level of 
cost-sharing within the insurance plans. Manning et al. (1987) found that lower coinsurance 
rates (less cost-sharing) increased the utilization of health care services but that these 
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additional services did not lead to any significant health benefits for those in the overall 
sample. The results from this study are the standard by which evaluations of the effect of 
insurance on individuals are made. However, these findings may no longer be generalizable 
due to the advances in the health care field since the HIE that may have led to the improved 
effectiveness of the medical treatments that individuals may have access to through health 
insurance (McWilliams 2009).    
More recent studies have relied on quasi-experimental designs to analyze the effect of 
health insurance on health outcomes. To avoid biases created by endogenous selection into 
health insurance and control for unobserved heterogeneity between the insured and 
uninsured, these studies have utilized natural experiments that exogenously assign insurance 
coverage to similar individuals. Researchers have frequently relied on the arbitrary 
assignment of individuals to Medicare eligibility at the age of sixty-five to explore these 
relationships. These analyses have established that health insurance increases the use of 
health care services and leads to improvements in health among the elderly as measured 
across a range of different outcomes. Studies have also found that Medicare increases the 
number of doctor visits, hospitalizations and other health care services that individuals obtain 
(Card, Dobkin and Maestas 2008; Decker 2005; McWilliams, Meara, Zaslavsky, and 
Ayanian 2003). These increases appear to be concentrated among those Medicare 
beneficiaries with serious health conditions and who were uninsured prior to turning 65 
(McWilliams, Meara, Zaslavsky, and Ayanian 2007).  Medicare also appears to have 
improved objective and subjective measures of individual health. Card, Dobkin and Maestas 
(2009) found that Medicare produced lasting reductions in the mortality rate of those 
admitted to the emergency room, and Lichtenburg (2002) found that Medicare leads to a 
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reduction in the mortality rate for those over age 65. Medicare also decreases the probability 
of late detection of breast cancer and reduces the chance of death among those diagnosed 
with breast cancer by 11 percent (Decker 2005). Here again, the benefits of health insurance 
on health appear to be concentrated among the previously uninsured. McWilliams et al. 
(2007) found that the trends in several measures of self-reported health among the uncovered 
improved significantly relative to those with health insurance prior to enrolling in Medicare. 
While the two are not entirely comparable forms of coverage, research regarding 
health insurance suggests that obtaining prescription drug coverage is likely to affect 
utilization behavior and possibly result in positive health outcomes, particularly among those 
without prior coverage.   
Prescription Drug Insurance and Part D 
Determining the effect of prescription drug coverage is a relatively new field of 
inquiry but researchers have been attempting to quantify the effects of coverage on the health 
care utilization behavior and health outcomes of individuals prior to the establishment of the 
Medicare Part D program. These studies typically relied on samples of elderly individuals, 
possibly because the elderly take more medications and spend a higher percentage of their 
out-of-pocket expenditures on prescription drugs (McKercher, Taylor, Lee, Chao, and Kumar 
2003). The results from these analyses provide evidence that obtaining prescription drug 
coverage leads to an increase in prescription use and to modest declines in out-of-pocket 
prescription drug expenditures (Lillard, Rogowski, and Kington 1999; Yang, Gilleskie, and 
Norton 2009; Shea, Terza, Stuart, and Briesacher 2007; Khan and Kaestner 2009). With 
respect to health, Yang, Gilleskie, and Norton (2009), found that obtaining prescription drug 
coverage was associated with a decline in individual mortality rates.  
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More recent studies have focused on estimating the effect of expanding prescription 
drug coverage to Medicare beneficiaries through the Part D program and have confirmed the 
results from earlier work. These investigations have the advantage of being able to exploit 
the natural experiment arising from the establishment of Part D in 2006 as a means of 
addressing the confounding effect of self-selection among those with coverage. Using a 
difference-in-difference analysis, Yin et al. (2008) and Lichtenberg and Sun (2007) estimated 
that Part D led to modest increases of 5.9 and 13 percent, respectively, in increased 
prescription drug utilization among the elderly. Using the year 2006 as an instrumental 
variable in a two-stage least squares regression model with a difference-in-difference 
estimator, Kaestner and Khan (2010) found that Part D led to much larger increases in 
prescription drugs utilization. They estimated that Part D resulted in a 70 percent increase in 
the number of prescriptions taken by an individual over the course of a year. The discrepancy 
in effect sizes is likely attributable to differences in how the studies determined assignment to 
treatment and comparison samples.
12
 Drug coverage drives the marginal costs associated 
with obtaining prescription drugs down for covered individuals which, in all likelihood, 
contributes to the observed increase in prescription consumption. Presumably, the increases 
in utilization measured in these studies are capturing the expected response of consumers that 
no longer incur the full cost associated with obtaining prescription medications. Lichtenberg 
and Sun (2007) found that Part D led to an 18.4 percent decline in the out-of-pocket 
expenditures of Part D enrollees. Using a different data set and similar, but slightly modified 
                                                 
12
 The Lichtenberg and Sun (2007) study employs a comparison sample consisting of nonelderly individuals 
that were not eligible for Medicare.  The Yin et al. (2008) study used a comparison sample of those that were 
just below the threshold for Medicare eligibility from age 60 to 63.  
 
  
43 
 
 
comparison sample, Yin et al. (2008) estimated a similar decline of 13.1 percent in out-of-
pocket prescription expenditures.  
While the effect of Part D on prescription utilization and out-of-pocket expenditures 
appears to be robust across multiple studies, researchers have only begun to analyze the 
implications of increased access to and utilization of prescription drugs—due to the 
expansion of drug coverage through Part D—for an individual’s health. The most recent 
study by Kaestner and Khan (2010) represents the first of such attempts. Like previous 
studies of Part D, they exploited the natural experiment produced by the introduction of Part 
D in 2006. Unlike previous studies, the authors used an instrumental variable within a 
difference-in-difference model to estimate the effect of Part D on functional limitations and 
the self-reported health among the elderly. Using a pooled sample of data from the Medicare 
Current Beneficiary Survey, they found that prescription drug coverage through Part D has 
yielded no substantial improvements in the general health of Medicare beneficiaries and that 
the program was actually associated with an increase the number of physical limitations 
measured among these individuals. These results led the authors to question the value of 
increasing prescription drug coverage through the Part D program.  
Key Questions and Hypotheses  
This paper uses a quasi-experimental approach with two treatment groups to estimate 
the effect of Medicare Part D on four outcomes: total out-of-pocket health expenditures, non-
adherence to prescription regimes, self-reported health declines, and self-reported health 
status. The treatment groups in this analysis will be used to estimate two different, but 
closely related types of treatment effects. The first effect is that of obtaining prescription 
drug coverage and it will be estimated using Group 1 which is composed of those individuals 
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that did not have prescription drug coverage prior to enrolling in Part D. The second 
treatment effect measures the program effect of the Part D. This effect is estimated using 
Group 2, a second treatment group composed of individuals with prescription drug coverage 
prior to enrolling in a Part D plan but who nonetheless enrolled in Part D. Because these 
individuals were covered before enrolling in Part D, this analysis will look for changes in the 
observed outcomes resulting from this transition, which is, therefore, defined here as the 
program effect. A more extensive explanation of the groups employed in this analysis is 
provided in Section IV, but this brief introduction is necessary to understand the inclusion of 
group-specific hypotheses in the sub-sections below.  
Out-of-Pocket Expenditures 
One of the primary objectives of the Part D program was to help lower the out-of-
pocket medical expenditures incurred by the Medicare population. By providing prescription 
drug coverage, this program directly targeted the second largest out-of-pocket health 
expenditure for all U.S. households (see Figure 2). Prescription expenditures typically 
represent an even larger share of the out-of-pocket health expenditures among the elderly and 
disabled because they tend to be in worse general health, have more chronic health 
conditions, and  have higher rates of disability relative to the general population and 
therefore, demand more prescriptions (Adams, Soumerai, Ross-Degnan 2001; Blustein 2000; 
Lillard et al. 1999; Rogowski and Lillard, 1997; Soumerai and Ross-Degnan 1999; Stuart and 
Coulson 1994; McKercher et al. 2003). Among those without coverage in the HRS in 2004, 
prescription expenditures accounted for 38 percent of their total out-of-pocket expenditures.  
Findings from previous studies provide evidence that Part D has led to a decrease in 
individuals’ out-of-pocket prescription expenditures (Lichtenberg and Sun 2007; Yin et al. 
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2009). This analysis will analyze whether this decrease is substantial enough to lower an 
individual’s total out-of-pocket health expenditures. It is expected that the Part D will lead to 
substantial reductions in this amount for Group 1 for three reasons: (1) prescription drugs 
represented such a large fraction of total health care expenditures, (2) drug coverage may 
allow the individual to obtain the prescriptions that may help reduce health complications 
that may have otherwise been costly to treat and may have required additional out-of-pocket 
expenditures and (3) drug coverage lowers the cost of prescription therapy relative to other 
forms of health care that may require greater out-of-pocket expenditures to obtain.  
Group 1 - Hypothesis 1a: Obtaining prescription drug coverage lowers 
the total out-of-pocket medical expenditures of households.  
 It is also expected that individuals in Group 2 will have lower total out-of-pocket 
medical expenditures. While individuals in Group 2 had drug coverage prior to enrolling in 
Part D, the results from a regression analysis estimating the likelihood that an individual with 
coverage substituted their existing plan for a Part D plan suggest that this transition may 
result in lower out-of-pocket expenditures, including the cost of prescription plan premiums. 
The regression results displayed in column 2 of Table 3 indicate that those with plans 
covering only ―some‖ of their prescription drug costs in 2004 were more likely to enroll in a 
Part D plan than were those with a plan that covered ―all‖ or ―most‖ of their prescription 
costs. These results indicate that having less comprehensive coverage increased the 
probability that an individual enrolled in Part D by 22 percentage points (Table 3). While it is 
impossible to determine from the data, these results suggest that those with less coverage 
may have left their existing plans because they were less comprehensive than those available 
through Part D. This additional coverage could lead to less out-of-pocket expenditures. 
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Group 2 - Hypothesis 1b: Enrollment in the Part D program by those 
with prior coverage will lower their total out-of-pocket expenditures.  
It is possible, however, that the income effect generated from the decrease in 
prescription costs may attenuate or offset these declines once health expenditures are 
aggregated for each individual. Health care is a normal good which means that the income 
elasticity of demand for health care is positive. Therefore, it is possible that the observed 
decrease in individual prescription drug expenditures may increase individual consumption 
of other health services. This behavior would serve to offset the decline in out-of-pocket 
prescription expenditures to the individual’s total out-of-pocket expenditures. While this 
reaction may attenuate the effect of Part D on total out-of-pocket health expenditures, I 
consider this reaction unlikely because prescription drug costs represents such a large 
fraction of total out-of-pocket expenditures, and the estimated magnitude of the income 
elasticity of the demand for health is relatively small, falling between the range of 0 and .2 
(Ringel, Hosek, Vollaard, and Mahnovski 2000).  
Adherence 
Next, I expect that access to prescription drug coverage will increase adherence to 
prescription drug regimes. As Safran et al. (2005) reported, those without coverage were 
more likely to have avoided or reduced their prescription drug use due to costs. Data from the 
Health and Retirement Survey indicate adherence was difficult for a substantial fraction of 
members from both treatment groups in this analysis (Group 1: 15 percent; Group 2: 11 
percent). Given that researchers have consistently demonstrated a reduction in the out-of-
pocket prescription drug expenditures among those who enrolled in Part D without prior 
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coverage, I expect to find that fewer individuals report having sacrificed adherence to their 
prescription drug regime to avoid the costs associated with this form of therapy.  
Group 1 - Hypothesis 2a: Enrollment in a prescription drug coverage 
plan decreases the rate at which of individual reported that costs led 
them to take less medication than was prescribed to them.   
Group 2 - Hypothesis 2b: Enrollment in Part D decreases the rate at 
which of individual reported that costs led them to take less 
medication than was prescribed to them.   
 The results from the third and fourth column of Table 3 indicate that higher 
prescription expenditures are associated with higher rates of non-adherence for individuals in 
Groups 1 and 2. The results suggest that a one percent increase in out-of-pocket prescription 
expenditures increases the likelihood that an individual reports taking less prescriptions than 
have been prescribed to them by 2.4 and 3.1 percentage points for Group 1 and Group 2, 
respectively. If Part D is successful in reducing these costs, it is possible that the cost-related 
rates of non-adherence will decline.      
Health Declines 
The second part of this analysis examines health outcomes. The Kaestner and Khan 
(2010) study marks the first attempt by researchers to estimate the actual effect of Medicare 
Part D on individual health. Using data from the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey, the 
authors concluded that Part D is associated with ―worsening functional health‖ and does not 
lead to significant improvements in general health. Their results would suggest that there is 
little to be gained in terms of health from increasing prescription drug coverage. However, 
there are critical concerns regarding the suitability of some of the outcomes they used to 
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estimate the relationships in their data and there were problems associated with the statistical 
power of their analysis that precluded the estimation of smaller health effects that call into 
question strength of their claims.    
The authors employed multiple health outcome measures from the activities of daily 
living (ADL) and instrumental activities of daily living (IADL) indices. The ADL and IADL 
are composite scores indicating whether the individual has difficulty or limitations on such 
things as eating, dressing, bathing, walking, using a phone, going shopping, managing 
money, and doing housework. There are multiple reasons to question appropriateness of this 
outcome to measure the effect of Part D on health. First, the Medicare population consists 
entirely of elderly and disabled individuals, who, by the nature of their advanced age and 
general health condition, likely have intractable physical limitations. Even if prescription 
drugs are able to improve mobility, there is a limit to extent to which these individuals would 
regain their functional capacity. Second, these indices measure functionality through ease of 
task completion, but physical limitations among the elderly and disabled are not always 
symptoms of ailments treatable through prescription drugs. This is especially true when one 
considers the components of the ADL/IADL indices used in their analysis. Aside from those 
with psychiatric impairments, prescription drugs may not significantly improve an 
individual’s ability to manage their money, go shopping, or use a phone for those with 
physical limitations. Furthermore, the drugs taken by most of those in Part D have little or 
nothing to do with functionality. According to data from the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMMS), of the ten drugs taken by most frequently by Part D enrollees 
only one (Advair) may improve the functional capacity of the elderly.
13
 The prescriptions 
                                                 
13
 Advair is taken to help with respiratory issues. 
 
  
49 
 
 
most frequently filled are for drugs intended to reduce blood pressure, regulate cholesterol, 
and to treat diabetes (Hargrave, Hoadley, Cubanski, and Neuman 2009). These drugs are 
intended to reduce the risk of a negative health shock rather than improve mobility or 
physical limitations. Therefore, Part D may not have a significant or a direct affect on either 
the ADL or IADL. On the contrary, by regulating health conditions that may otherwise result 
in rapid health declines that lead to death, access to prescription drugs through drug coverage 
may actually increase the average number of disabilities found among Medicare beneficiaries 
as sick individuals are able to live longer. When Yang, Gilleskie, and Norton (2009) coupled 
their findings regarding the negative effect of prescription drug coverage on individual 
mortality rates with the positive effect of prescription drug coverage on the number of IADLs 
and ADLs, they concluded that the survival of sick individuals resulted in an increase in the 
average number of functional limitations found among the elderly. This would indicate that 
the positive effect of Part D on the IADLs and ADLs indices measured by Kaestner and 
Khan (2010) was actually capturing the same indirect effect of Part D prescription drug 
coverage on these outcomes through longevity. Because most of the prescriptions taken by 
these individuals are intended to reduce the risk of a negative health shock and ameliorate the 
symptoms resulting from chronic conditions, rather than improving or eliminating the 
underlying condition, the more relevant question appears to be whether obtaining 
prescription drug coverage has helped stabilize the rate of individual health declines.  
Group 1 - Hypothesis 3a: Enrollment in prescription drug coverage 
will help reduce the rate at which individuals report a health decline.  
Group 2 - Hypothesis 3b:  Enrollment in Part D will help reduce the 
rate at which individuals report a health decline. 
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Self-Reported Health Status 
This analysis will also re-examine the relationship between Part D and general health 
outcome analyzed by Kaestner and Khan (2010). They operationalized general health by 
collapsing a five scale self-reported health status (excellent/very good/good/fair/poor) into a 
dichotomous measure indicating whether the individual was in good or better health. The 
authors concluded that Part D was not associated with any large improvements in general 
health; however, it is worth revisiting this analysis due to the lack of statistical power 
associated with their estimation.  
The lack of statistical power prevented Kaestner and Khan (2010) from being able to 
reliably detect effect sizes within 33 percent of a standard deviation of the mean. This is an 
important limitation because it is likely that any health effect of prescription drug coverage 
would likely to be small given, again, the advanced age and physical condition of the 
Medicare population and the fact that the prescriptions taken most frequently by Part D 
enrollees are aimed at regulating symptoms and health shocks associated with chronic health 
conditions. More importantly, the decline in the general health of seniors over time likely 
places a low upper bound the positive effect size of prescription drug coverage. It is likely 
that, for the elderly, the most a prescription drug can do is help mitigate the rate of this 
natural and inevitable decline. These factors may place a low upper bound on the positive 
effect of Part D on general health and diminish the likelihood of a substantial improvement in 
health. Thus, the analysis run by Kaestner and Khan (2010) would not have captured what is 
likely a small effect size.  
Their use of a two-stage instrumental variable research design may have contributed 
to the lack of statistical power in their analysis. This method can lead to overly large standard 
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errors and inconsistent estimates when the correlation between the instrument and the 
instrumented variable is low, increasing the likelihood of making a Type II error (Bound, 
Jaeger, and Baker 1995). For this reason, this analysis will attempt to estimate the effect of 
Part D on general health more precisely and efficiently using a different research design that 
does not rely on instrumentation.   
I will re-examine whether Part D had an effect on general health. However, in light of 
the general decline in the percent of those reporting to be in good or better health over time 
(See Figure 3: ―Percent Reporting to be in Good Health‖), the results of this analysis will be 
interpreted as the effect of Part D on individuals’ transition from ―good‖ to ―poor‖ health. 
That is, it is more likely that Part D reduced the rate at which individuals transitioned from 
good health to bad health over time rather than moving individuals from bad health to good 
health. Under this interpretation, the effect of Part D is not in improving health but in 
preserving it.   
Group 1 - Hypothesis 4a: Enrollment in prescription drug coverage 
will reduce the rate at which individuals transition from good health to 
poor health.  
Group 2 - Hypothesis 4b: Enrollment in Part D will reduce the rate at 
which individuals transition from good health to poor health. 
In sum, this analysis employs utilization outcomes that are important for determining 
whether Part D has been successful in two important goals of the program: (1) reducing total 
health expenditures and (2) improving adherence to prescribed treatments by helping 
eliminate the barrier imposed by prescription drug costs. The analysis will also attempt to 
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estimate the health effect of Part D using outcomes that are amenable to prescription drug 
therapy and a research design that does not require a valid and strong instrumental variable.  
Methods and Data   
The data used in this study comes from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), a 
nationally representative sample of elderly U.S. residents born in 1947 or earlier. The 
longitudinal survey design of the HRS allows researchers to follow older cohorts as they 
make the transition from work into retirement. Every two years this survey compiles 
information on the demographics, health, social, and economic factors from the more than 
20,000 elderly individuals it follows. This analysis will utilize the rich demographic and 
health-related variables in the HRS as well as information regarding Part D and prescription 
drug coverage. This analysis relies on data from the 2004 to 2008 waves of this survey.   
This analysis relies on an exogenous source of variation to implement a 
counterfactual approach to estimate the effect of prescription drug coverage through the 
Medicare Part D program on health-related outcomes. The exogenous factor in this analysis 
is the date in which Part D prescription drug coverage became available to those eligible for 
Medicare. The natural experiment afforded by the introduction of this program in 2006 
allows for a difference-in-difference research design to analyze the effect of Part D on the 
outcomes outlined above. This is the method most frequently employed by researchers to 
analyze the effect of Part D on health-related outcomes (Yin et al. 2008; Lichtenberg and Sun 
2007; Kaestner and Khan 2010).   
Difference-in-difference (DID) estimation is useful for making comparisons across 
groups in instances where at least one of those groups in question was exposed to an 
intervention or treatment (treatment group) and at least one of those groups was not (control 
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group). This method requires that outcomes of interest and any covariates be observed for the 
exposed and unexposed groups in time periods both prior to (pre-treatment) and following 
the introduction of the treatment (post-treatment). Estimation of the treatment effect using 
DID is accomplished by calculating the difference in the pre-treatment and post-treatment 
change in the outcome of interest between the treatment and control groups over time. 
Interpreting any difference as a causal treatment effect requires the assumption that in the 
absence of the treatment, any differences in the outcomes observed between the two groups 
would be the same over time and that no other group-specific changes or interventions have 
occurred that might also account for the change.  
Unlike many quasi-experimental designs, DID estimation does not require the 
expectation of pre-treatment equivalence between treatment and control groups. In fact, DID 
models allow for systematic differences in the pre-treatment mean of the outcome for 
treatment and control groups but require that those observed differences are the consistent 
over time and would otherwise remain in the absence of treatment. Propensity scores require 
that all the variables necessary for selection to be known, measured, and modeled (Cook, 
Shadish, and Wong 2008; Diaz and Handa 2006). Many of the variables measured in the 
HRS may be correlated with selection into the Part D program, but it is difficult to be certain 
that the available data is sufficient to model the selection equation accurately. The use of 
regression discontinuity is also problematic due to the survey design of the HRS and the lack 
of information available about the specific dates regarding drug coverage and enrollment in 
Part D. No continuous measure is available that would easily accommodate this type of 
analysis. The DID estimator represents the most effective means by which to estimate the 
treatment effect of Part D while requiring the fewest number of identifying assumptions.     
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The key identifying assumption of this method is that the mean values of the outcome 
variable for each group share a common trend prior to the introduction of the treatment. The 
validity of this assumption can be tested by analyzing the trends in the outcome over time 
between the two groups. A second important assumption is that the control group is 
unaffected by the treatment, in this case Medicare Part D. The evidence substantiating the 
plausibility of this assumption is less direct and will require an evaluation of the available 
evidence regarding the impact of Part D on those with prescription drug coverage from 
sources outside of Medicare. There is substantial heterogeneity in the types of coverage 
offered by plans within the Part D program so any effect measured is the average effect 
across each of these different plans.      
After verification of the necessary assumptions, the DID estimators are included in 
ordinary least squares regression models. These models are used to estimate two separate but 
related treatment effects: (1) the effect of prescription drug insurance in general and the (2) 
effect of Part D specifically on the health and health-related outcomes among a sample of 
Medicare-eligible individuals. Estimating each treatment effect thus requires the construction 
of the two unique treatment groups and the control group noted above. The next section 
discusses the construction of these groups in more detail.    
Pre-Treatment and Post-Treatment  
On January 1, 2006, individuals enrolled in Medicare could obtain prescription drug 
coverage through the Part D program. The timing of this policy change represents an 
exogenous shock in the availability of prescription drug coverage through Medicare and is 
used to define the pre-treatment and post-treatment time periods. In this analysis, the pre-
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treatment period is the 2004 wave of the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) and the post-
treatment time period is the 2008 wave.   
While the 2006 wave of the HRS contains data relevant to this analysis, this wave is 
excluded from this analysis for two reasons. First, the structure of the HRS survey does not 
allow for a clear distinction between pre- and post-treatment data in the 2006 wave. Because 
the HRS is administered every two years, respondents are frequently asked to include the 
inter-wave years when considering their responses to the survey questions. For example, in 
each wave of the HRS, respondents are asked whether they have experienced any health 
declines since their interview in the previous wave. Therefore, in the 2006 wave, respondents 
include any such decline that occurred between their interview in 2004 and their interview in 
2006. The inability to distinguish exactly when these declines occurred poses problems for 
determining the effect of Part D coverage on health declines in the years covered in the 2006 
wave because this program could not begin to affect this outcome until individuals were 
actually able to enroll in the program in 2006. The aggregation of responses across inter-
wave years may attenuate any estimated effect of Part D in the 2006 wave because 
individuals would have been exposed to the treatment in 2006, but the data from this wave 
would also include, for some respondents, changes in overall health and health expenditures 
from 2004 and 2005. Therefore, the 2008 wave of data will be considered as the only post-
treatment data point. This specification avoids the complications associated with the 
combination of pre-treatment and post-treatment outcomes in the 2006 wave and includes 
data collected exclusively in the post-treatment time period, between 2007 and 2008.  
Second, it is impossible to determine how long individuals have been covered by Part 
D in the 2006 wave of the data. The effect of Part D is unlikely to be immediate due to the 
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nature of pharmaceutical therapy, and utilization changes in the outcomes of interest may not 
respond immediately to drug coverage. For example, health does not always respond 
immediately to pharmaceutical therapy as the benefits frequently accrue with continued use 
over the long-term. Therefore, the duration of drug coverage through Part D may moderate 
the effect that coverage and prescriptions drugs obtained through this program have on an 
individual’s health outcomes. Without data measuring the duration of ones Part D coverage, 
it is difficult to isolate the total effect of drug coverage in the 2006 wave. In contrast, in the 
2008 wave individuals have been exposed to the treatment for two years or more, plenty of 
time for the effects of Part D prescription drug coverage to manifest themselves.
14
  
Treatment and Control Groups 
There are two treatment groups and one control group in this study, all of which are 
mutually exclusive. The first treatment group (Group 1) will be used to analyze the effect of 
prescription drug insurance on the health-related outcomes. This group consists of those 
Medicare-eligible individuals who reported having no prescription drug coverage in the 2004 
wave of the HRS, prior to obtaining drug coverage through a Part D plan in 2006. This group 
includes only those individuals who maintained their drug coverage in a Part D plan through 
2008. The treatment for this group is defined as the effect of prescription drug coverage. This 
interpretation is based on the fact that individuals in this group reported having no 
prescription drug coverage just prior to the establishment of Part D and enrolled in Part D 
when it became available; therefore, changes in the health-related outcomes relative to the 
control group may be interpreted as the result of having obtained prescription drug coverage 
from a Part D plan.  
                                                 
14
 A secondary analysis that includes the 2006 wave will also be conducted however, it is expected that the 
inclusion of this data will attenuate the estimates of the treatment effect in the DID models. 
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The second treatment group (Group 2) includes those Medicare beneficiaries who 
were covered by a prescription drug plan between 2002 and 2004, prior to enrolling in a Part 
D plan in 2006. Individuals in Group 2 changed their preexisting prescription drug coverage 
to a Part D plan when it became available in 2006. A separate specification of the treatment 
effect for Group 2 is necessary because the nature of the intervention is distinct for each 
treatment group. These individuals in Group 2 already had drug coverage so the treatment 
effect for this group is that of the Part D itself rather than other types of drug coverage. The 
DID estimates for this group will measure the effect of transitioning out of existing coverage 
into a Part D plan sponsored by Medicare. Any positive (negative) effects found may be 
attributable to better (or worse) coverage under a Part D plan rather than to prescription drug 
coverage in general.   
The control group (Control) is composed of Medicare-eligible individuals who had 
prescription drug coverage from an alternative source prior to the establishment of Part D and 
maintained that coverage through 2008. Individuals in the Control group are covered by 
Medicare but chose not to change their coverage to Part D when it became available. These 
individuals reported in the HRS survey that they did not sign up for Part D because they 
already had prescription drug coverage from another source. In order for this group to serve 
as an adequate counterfactual, there must be common trends in the mean values for the 
outcomes analyzed for this group and the treatment groups. It is also necessary that these 
individuals not be otherwise affected by the establishment of Part D. The plausibility of these 
assumptions will be explored in the next section.
15
  
                                                 
15
 A second possible control group could be assembled from those individuals that reported having no coverage 
in both the pre-treatment and post-treatment periods. Because these individuals have not reported prescription 
drug coverage at any point during the reference period considered in this analysis, it is unlikely that these 
individuals have been affected by the Part D program. However, this group of individuals represents a small 
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To be included in either treatment group the individual had to have obtained their Part 
D coverage in 2006 and maintained it through 2008. Treated individuals may have changed 
their plan since enrolling in the Part D program in 2006, but as long their plan remains within 
the Part D program, they are included in their respective treatment group. The control group 
was limited to those individuals that reported to have had prescription drug coverage from a 
source external to Medicare in 2004, 2006 as well as in 2008. These restrictions are 
necessary to ensure that individuals in both treatment groups were receiving the treatment for 
the entire post-treatment period and that members of the control group did not receive 
coverage from Part D during the post-treatment period. Also, all groups are limited to those 
individuals who reported taking prescription medications regularly in all three of the 2004, 
2006 and 2008 waves of the HRS.
16
 This step was necessary because the HRS only asks 
about the drug coverage of those who reported taking prescriptions regularly. This restriction 
will likely limit the entire estimation sample to those who have long-term negative health 
conditions. Limiting the sample to those who have been taking prescriptions regularly over 
time may bias the likelihood of finding a positive treatment effect because the estimation 
sample likely consists of individuals with persistent health complications that may be in the 
most need of prescription therapy and drug coverage.   
Identifying Assumptions of the Difference-in-Difference Research Design 
                                                                                                                                                       
fraction of the total sample. There are 104 individuals in this group accounting for 2.5 percent of the total 
sample and 5 percent of the total sample that did not enroll in Medicare Part D. Allowing this group to serve as 
the counterfactual in this analysis would drive down the statistical power of this estimation and produce 
efficient estimates.   
 
16
 The HRS does not provide a definition for ―regularly.‖ The survey simply asks the respondent to answer 
―yes‖ or ―no‖ to the question: ―Do you take prescription medications regularly?‖ Those that answered in the 
affirmative were included in the analysis.  
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Difference-in-difference estimation does not require an assumption of equivalence on 
the observed covariates between the treatment and control groups. It does, however, require 
the assumption that the observed differences in time trends of the outcome variables between 
the treatment and control groups remain consistent in the absence of treatment. The standard 
method to test the plausibility of this assumption compares the pretreatment time trends of 
outcome variables for the treatment and control groups. Stability in the differences in the pre-
treatment time trends is considered evidence that supports the validity of the identifying 
assumption. Figure 3 displays the pretreatment trends for those assigned to the treatment and 
control groups for each outcome used in this analysis. The data points in the figures reflect 
the group-specific mean for a particular outcome in a given year from 2000 to 2008.
17
  
In general, the differences in the group-specific pretreatment means of the utilization 
variables appear to be stable for Group 1 and the Control group. The average amount out-of-
pocket expenditures appear to increase for both groups in each wave between 2000 and 2004 
and the difference in growth rate appears stable over the pretreatment period. While the 
upward trend in the rate at which individuals report taking less medication than what was 
prescribed to them is steeper for Group 1, the difference in the rate of increase appears 
constant between the two groups. There is also strong support for the validity of the 
identifying assumption for causal claims within the difference-in-difference method of 
estimation among the health outcomes analyzed in this study. The time trend for the mean 
estimates of the percent of those reporting to be in good health and those reporting a health 
decline are stable in the pretreatment period.  
                                                 
17
 Data from the year 2006 are excluded from these figures. The inclusion of 2006 data does not change the 
interpretation of the results.  
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The results of the comparison for the pretreatment trends between Group 2 and the 
Control group, however, are mixed. The group-specific time trends for the out-of-
expenditures and the percent of individuals reporting to be in good health are similar for each 
group. The direction of the trends are consistent and, more importantly, the difference 
between the estimates of the mean appear stable over time. In contrast, the pretreatment 
trends between the two groups for the average percent of individuals in each group who 
report taking less medication than they were prescribed due to cost and for those who report 
health declines do not appear to be stable. The divergence in the pretreatment trends of these 
outcomes violates the key identifying assumption of the difference-in-difference 
methodology; therefore, these outcomes will be excluded from the discussion of the results of 
the effect of Part D on Group 2.  
A regression analysis of the pre-2006 data reveals that there are some significant 
differences in the pre-treatment trends for the observed outcomes between the treatment and 
control groups. To capture the changes in the trends between the groups, interaction terms 
were included indicating the year and treatment group assignment. The regressions were run 
separately for Group 1 and the Control and Group 2 and the Control. The results from these 
regressions are provided in Table 4. Given the rapid rise in medical expenditures, particularly 
for prescription drugs (see Figure 1); it is unsurprising that the out-of-pocket expenditures 
increased at a more rapid rate among those without drug coverage prior to enrolling Part D 
(Group 1) than for the Control group in each year analyzed. There were also significant 
differences between the pre-treatment trends in the rate of non-compliance between Group 1 
and the Control group in 2004. That out-of-pocket expenditures and the rates of those taking 
fewer prescriptions due to costs were increasing for these groups is not surprising given that 
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these individuals bore full cost of the rising costs of prescription therapy. In fact, this was 
part of the logic behind providing drug coverage through Medicare. While these differences 
are important to note, they should not invalidate the findings for these outcomes because 
there was no variation in direction of the trends (they were constantly increasing), and it is 
unlikely that any estimated effect of Part D in changing the direction of these trends would be 
confounded by a regression to the mean as prescription drug prices have not appeared to 
decline over time. That is, these differences would be expected to continue to trend upward 
in the absence of Part D and rising prescription expenditures. Finally, there were no 
significant differences in the changes in the pre-treatment trend lines for Group 1 and Control 
over time for either of the health outcomes. A Wald test confirmed that these coefficients 
were not jointly significant at the .05 level.    
The regressions including Group 2 and the Control indicate that there were no 
significant differences between the pre-treatment trends in the out-of-pocket expenditures for 
these groups. This is, perhaps, unsurprising given that neither of these groups bore the full 
cost of their prescription drugs. However, there were significant reductions over time 
between the pre-treatment trend lines in the Group 2 and the Control for rate at which 
individuals reported taking less prescription drugs due to costs and for rate at which 
individuals reported a decline in their health status. This finding suggests that attributing 
changes in these outcomes to Part D may not be possible because the continued convergence 
of the trends may be mistakenly interpreted as the effect of Medicare Part D on these 
outcomes for this group. The was also a significant difference in the pre-treatment trend in 
the rate of those reporting to be in good health in Group 2 relative to the Control. Given the 
small difference in the trend lines for this outcome between these two groups, it is possible 
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that a small effect estimated for Part D could represent a regression to the mean rather than a 
treatment effect. For this reason the discussion of the results will focus, primarily, on those 
for Group 1. 
A second important assumption is that Medicare Part D had no affect on the control 
group. The control group is composed of those Medicare-eligible individuals that did not 
enroll in Part D in 2006 or 2008 because, as they reported, they ―already have good 
prescription drug coverage.‖ The HRS does not specify the source of this coverage, but the 
source is either an employer or government program other than Medicare. Because Part D is 
not mandatory, its availability should not have a direct affect on the health-related outcomes 
of individuals who do not enroll. However, it is possible that Part D may have an indirect 
effect on alternative sources of coverage by increasing demand in the prescription drug 
market, thereby increasing prescription drug prices in addition to the issues associated with 
―credibility‖ outlined in the previous section. An increase in the price of prescription drugs 
may lead those offering prescription drug plans to reduce coverage or increase the premium 
or deductible that plan participants must pay. However, the available evidence suggests that 
Part D has had no such effect. In fact, Duggan and Morton (2011) found that the program 
structure Part D actually led to a decrease in the price of brand name pharmaceuticals. A 
decrease in the price of pharmaceuticals could attenuate any positive relationship between the 
health-related outcomes in this study and Part D to the extent that this price decline increases 
the likelihood that members of the control group have newfound access to these drugs and 
that these drugs are effective in addressing their health problems and to the extent that these 
declines reduced the out-of-pocket expenditures of the Control group.  
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However, it is important to point out a change that resulted from Part D that may 
contaminate the control group. The MMA established that the coverage that  a Medicare 
beneficiary with coverage outside of the Part D program be ―creditable‖, that is, it must pay 
at least much as Medicare’s standard prescription drug coverage of the participant’s 
prescription drug costs, on average.
18
 Neuman et al. (2007) estimate that, at most, 8 percent 
of seniors that had drug coverage prior to this new requirement did not have creditable 
coverage. It is impossible to identify those with non-credible coverage in the HRS so 
individuals in the control group may have had their coverage change as a result of Part D. 
Going from a non-credible to a credible plan may attenuate the treatment effect in this 
estimation, particularly for the cost-related outcomes in this analysis as this requirement 
establishes a lower bound on benefit levels for existing plans. Finally, it is also possible that 
the prescription plans among the control group became less generous or comprehensive 
between 2004 and 2008. If the coverage of the control group became worse relative to the 
coverage provided by Part D, then the estimates in this study will be biased upward.   
The Model 
                       (       )                                   (1) 
The DID estimation strategy shown in Equation 1 models the outcomes using pooled 
OLS regression where Ti is a dummy variable indicating whether the individual is assigned 
to the treatment (Ti =1) or control (Ti = 0), Pit is dummy variable indicating whether the time 
period is pre-treatment, prior to the establishment of Part D, (Pit = 0) or post-treatment, after 
the establishment of Part D, (Pit = 0), Xit is a vector of control variables outlined below and 
                                                 
18
 Creditable coverage must provide coverage for brand name and generic drugs, reasonable access to retailers, 
pay at least 60 percent of participants’ prescription drug expenses. It must also have either a maximum annual 
benefit payable by the plan of at least $25,000 or a deductible of no more than $250 per year        
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listed in Table 1, and εit is a random error component with a mean of zero (E[εit] = 0). The 
interaction term (Ti * Pit) equals one if Ti = 1 (treatment group) and Pit = 1 (post-Part D). The 
coefficient δ is the difference-in-difference parameter, measuring the effect of Part D on the 
outcome Yit in question. Equation (1) is estimated using robust standard errors to correct for 
the serial correlation that likely exist between the error terms of the multiple observations of 
individuals in the pooled sample and heteroscedastic errors in the linear probability models.      
Variables 
 The HRS has detailed measures on health and health-care utilization including self-
reported health, self-reported health declines, activities of daily living limitations (ADL), 
instrumental activities of daily living limitations (IADL), out-of-pocket health expenditures, 
prescription drugs, and various measures on the number and type of health care services 
received. These variables comprise the outcome measures tested in this analysis.  
Utilization-Related Outcome Variables 
Out-of-Pocket Expenditures 
This outcome variable is a continuous measure of the out-of-pocket medical 
expenditures incurred by the individual over the past two-years (between survey waves). This 
measure is the sum of eight different components of health care expenditures paid by the 
individual: 1) hospital costs, 2) nursing home costs, 3) doctor visits costs, 4) dentists costs, 5) 
outpatient surgery costs, 6) prescription drug costs, 7) home health care and 8) special 
facilities costs. As a result, only those individuals with positive out-of-pocket medical 
expenditures are included in this analysis. This is not a significant restriction because Part D 
was implemented, in part, to lower the out-of-pocket prescription expenditures of the elderly. 
The program would not be expected to benefit those who have no out-of-pocket health 
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expenditures. This effect of Part D on the outcome was tested at a number of different levels 
to minimize the likelihood that outlying observations were skewing the effect size 
(0<$200,000; 0<100,000; 0<50,000; 0<$25,000; 0<$10,000; 0<$5,000). The results from the 
full sample are reported and discussed after the consistency of the relationship at each of the 
expenditure levels is confirmed.
19
 
Take Less Medication Due to Costs 
 This outcome variable is a dichotomous variable coded as 1 if the respondent reported 
taking less medication than was prescribed to them due to cost and 0 otherwise. This measure 
will be used to test whether Part D decreased the likelihood that individuals reported having 
failed to adhere to their prescribed prescription treatment. In other words, it will be used to 
test whether Part D increased the likelihood that individuals complied with their prescription 
therapy.    
Health-Related Outcome Variables 
Deterioration of Self-Reported Health Status 
 This dichotomous outcome variable indicates whether the health status of the 
individual has declined since the last interview wave. This variable is coded 1 if the 
individual reported that their health status had gotten worse over the previous two years and 
coded 0 if the individual reported that their health had improved or remained same over the 
past two years. This variable will also be used to test whether prescription drug coverage 
through Part D helped moderate health declines among the elderly.  
                                                 
19
 These additional sensitivity checks were necessary because there were a number of outlying observations. A 
log-transformation was not performed because it is more intuitive to think about the difference-in-difference in 
terms of actual dollar amounts rather than the difference-in-difference in terms of percent changes. 
Additionally, the interpretation of an interaction term in non-linear models is complex but statistical packages 
are widely available to accommodate this type of estimation (Ali and Norton 2003; Karaca-Mandic and Norton 
Forthcoming). 
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Self-Reported Health Status – Good Health  
 This outcome measure is a dichotomous variable indicating whether the individual is 
in good or better health. The variable is coded 1 if they reported themselves to be in ―good,‖ 
―very good,‖ or ―excellent,‖ health and 0 if the individual reported being in ―fair‖ or ―poor‖ 
health. Collapsing the categories into a dichotomized variable avoids placing undue 
importance on what may be arbitrary variation between say, ―very good‖ and ―excellent‖ 
response categories. This variable will be used to test whether individuals are more likely to 
report being in good health following the availability of prescription drug coverage through 
Part D. 
Control Variables 
 Demographic and socio-economic variables are also included to control for the effect 
that of age, race, marital status, education, total wealth (log-transformed), of the individuals 
on their health care utilization and health outcomes.
20
 Age and the log-transformed estimate 
of household wealth are entered into the regression models as continuous measures. 
Dichotomous variables are entered into the regression models that indicate whether the 
individual is African-American, male, married and whether the respondent has a high school 
diploma, whether have some college education, or a college degree or higher. Control 
variables that measure determinants of individual health are also included in the model. 
Using definitions from the Center for Disease Control, two dichotomous variables were 
constructed indicating whether an individual is over-weight and underweight are constructed 
based on their body mass index (BMI) measure. Individuals with a BMI of 25 or over were 
                                                 
20
 Household income was not included in the model due to concerns related to simultaneity bias. Because the 
health-related outcomes can affect income, the inclusion of this variable would bias the coefficients estimated 
for this variable as well as those correlated with income. For this reason, income is not included in any of the 
models estimated.   
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coded as 1 for the variable indicating whether an individual is over-weight and 0 otherwise. 
Those with a BMI less than 18.5 were assigned a value of 1 for the variable indicating 
whether an individual is under-weight and 0 otherwise. The respondents assigned to the base 
case for this analysis are those with ―normal‖ BMI measures (18.5 to 24.9). Another 
dichotomous measure was included indicating whether an individual currently smokes 
cigarettes. Finally, a lagged measure of physical mobility was included to help control for the 
effect of physical limitations on the outcome analyzed. The mobility variable is the sum of 
several dichotomous measures indicating whether an individual has difficulty walking one 
block, walking several blocks, walking across the room, and climbing one flight of stairs. 
This measure is a derivation of the ADL/IADL index that focuses on mobility and intended 
to be a proxy for physical condition. The ADL/IADL indices were not used because certain 
components of these measures were less relevant to physical condition such as the ability of 
the individual to use a telephone, microwave, or map. Larger values of the mobility index 
represent greater physical limitation. This measure is lagged to avoid the possibility of 
simultaneity bias where, for instance, a health decline leads to a reduction in physical and 
functional capacity.  
Descriptive Statistics 
  Table 1 presents summary statistics for the dependent and independent variables for 
the two treatment groups and the control group used in this analysis. The descriptive statistics 
in the table highlight important differences between the groups. Relative to the Control 
group, those in Groups 1 and 2 assigned to treatment have higher out-of-pocket medical 
expenditures and are less healthy according to each measure of individual health included in 
this study. The treatment groups are also much more likely to have reported to have taken 
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less medication than was proscribed to them due to the costs associated with prescription 
drug treatment. Individuals assigned to Group 1 and Group 2 are less likely to be female, are 
less educated, less mobile and are less likely to be married.
21
 While the systematic 
differences between the treatment and control groups are important, as noted above group 
equivalence is not a necessary assumption for estimating an unbiased treatment effect when 
using a difference-in-difference model because these group fixed-effects are ―differenced 
out‖ in the estimation procedure. 
 A linear probability model was used to help clarify the reasons why individuals 
enrolled in the Part D program in 2006. The estimates reported in Table 3 are obtained from 
regressing a dichotomous outcome indicating whether the individual enrolled in Part D in 
2006 on pre-treatment covariate measures from the 2004 wave of the HRS that are thought to 
be correlated with enrollment in the program. The coefficients of interest for full sample of 
Part D enrollees (from both Group 1 and Group 2) are on the variable indicating whether the 
individual was taking prescriptions regularly. For Group 2 the coefficient of interest was on 
the variable indicating whether their existing coverage paid only part, rather than most or all 
of the individual’s prescription costs. According to the estimates for the full sample in the 
first column of Table 3, individuals who reported taking prescription medications regularly 
were more likely to enroll in Part D by 15 percentage points than those who did not take 
medications regularly. This finding suggests that there was considerable need and unmet 
demand for drug coverage among those taking prescriptions most frequently. It is unclear, 
however, whether it was a lack of access, the high cost of coverage, or some other 
impediment that prevented these individuals from obtaining drug coverage prior to Part D. 
The results for Group 2 in the second column suggest that many left their existing coverage 
                                                 
21
 These differences are statistically significant at the .05 level. 
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due to under-coverage. Individuals who reported that their coverage covered only part of 
their prescription costs were more likely to exchange their existing coverage for Part D by 22 
percentage points. The results from both of these regressions suggest that the plans in Part D 
were attractive to those looking to obtain coverage as well as those looking to expand 
existing coverage. The important question addressed in the next section is whether by filling 
this demand for coverage, Part D has had any changes in health care utilization or health 
outcomes.   
Results 
 In this section I present evidence that Medicare Part D has led to large and significant 
reductions in both household health expenditures and the percent of Medicare beneficiaries 
that reported taking less medications than were prescribed to them due to costs. I also show 
that Part D has led to moderate reductions in the number of Medicare beneficiaries reporting 
health declines and even led to slight improvements in self-reported health. Panels A and B 
in Table 5 report, respectively, the regression results for Group 1 and Group 2 from the 
difference-in-difference estimation. The coefficient of interest in each is that of the 
interaction term Treatment*Post which is interpreted as the effect of Part D on the outcome 
in question. The results from Panel A suggest that Part D had the expected affect on each of 
the health care utilization and health outcomes analyzed for Group 1. The difference-in-
difference estimates for the effect of Part D on out-of-pocket medical expenditures indicate 
that drug coverage helped reduce out-of-pocket medical expenditures, decreased non-
adherence due to prescription costs and led to positive health outcomes, and the treatment 
effects were smaller for those in Group 2. 
Difference-in-Difference Results: Health Care Utilization  
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  The results depicted in the first and second column of Table 5, demonstrate that Part 
D had a negative and statistically significant effect on the total out-of-pocket health 
expenditures for both treatment groups. The coefficient on the DID estimator 
(Treatment*Post) in column 1 of Panel in Table 5 indicate that Part D led to a $3,105 
reduction, on average, in the out-of-pocket expenditures among Group 1. The first column in 
Panel B indicates that Part D led to $1,145 reduction in the out-of-pocket expenditures of 
those in Group 2. The estimates of the treatment effect are statistically significant for both 
groups. The relationship between Part D and non-adherence to prescribed drug treatment also 
took the expected direction. These results are reflected in second column of each panel. The 
estimates on the DID estimator indicate that Part D resulted in 7.9 percentage point drop in 
the rate of cost-related non-adherence for Group 1. This decline represented a statistically 
significant change. The change for Group 2 represented a more modest decline of 1.4 
although this estimate was not statistically significant. Over the same period the out-of-
pocket expenditures of the control group increased only slightly but by a non-significant 
amount. Non-adherence also increased by a modest 1.2 percentage points from the pre- and 
post-treatment period for the control group. These increases reflect a continuation of the pre-
treatment trends of both outcomes for the Control group and imply that Part D had no effect 
on this group and that there were no other period effects that may be distorting the results. 
The stability of these trends provides more evidence in support of the claim for the treatment 
effects measured for the treatment groups.  
Difference-in-Difference Results: Health Outcomes  
 The right-hand columns of Table 5 present the results from the two key measures of 
health analyzed in this study: (1) ―Did the individual report a health decline in the previous 
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two years?‖ and (2) ―Did the individual report to be in good health?‖ based on self-reported 
data. According to the difference-in-difference estimate from Group 1 in column 3 of Table 
5, enrollment in Part D is associated with a statistically significant decrease in the likelihood 
that an individual reports a health decline by 4.3 percentage points. Column 4 displays the 
result from the regression estimating the effect of Part D on self-reported health for Group 1. 
The coefficient on the DID estimator indicates that Part D has led to a significant 6.5 
percentage point increase in the likelihood that an individual in Group 1 reported to be in 
good health. The DID estimators in each of the models for Group 2 were smaller in 
magnitude and not statistically significant.  
The regression results indicate that, after controlling for the covariates in the model, 
the Control group was only slightly less likely to report a health decline, but this decline was 
not significantly different than zero. The rate at which individuals in the Control group 
reported being in good health did decline by a statistically significant 4.1 percentage points in 
the model for Group 1 (a 3.8 percentage point decline in the model for Group 2). This 
decrease likely represents the natural rate in the decline of health as the graph plotting the 
mean estimates of the ―Percent Reporting to be in Good Health‖ appears to continue its 
downward trajectory. This is the expected result from the aging process of sample of elderly 
individuals.     
Discussion 
This analysis has shown that Part D has led to important and substantial changes in 
health care utilization and modest positive effects on individual health outcomes. The effect 
of prescription drug coverage estimated for Group 1 is evident for each outcome in this 
analysis. The treatment effect of the Part D program itself (Group 2), however, is limited to a 
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reduction in out-of-pocket expenditures which is intuitive as many in this group were less 
likely to have had comprehensive coverage prior to Part D (see Table 3). The findings imply 
that those in Group 2 might have already realized the health benefits from prescription drug 
use in their previous plan and continued to do so within Part D with no discernable change.  
The findings from this analysis on out-of-pocket expenditures comport with the 
available literature regarding the effect of Part D on prescription expenditures. This study 
found that Part D led to a decline in the overall health expenditures for individuals without 
prior coverage as well as for those who substituted their existing coverage for a Part D plan. 
The decline in total health expenditures measured in this analysis is likely the combination of 
two effects. The first is the well-documented direct effect of the reduction of drug 
expenditures after obtaining drug coverage. The second effect may be the result of the 
substitution of costly medical procedures for prescription drug therapy. Researchers have 
tried, without success, to establish empirical evidence for this effect (Yang et al. 2009; 
Kaestner and Khan 2010). Their inability to document a substitution effect may be 
attributable, in part, to the near-universal insurance coverage afforded to the elderly through 
Medicare. Medicare may keep the out-of-pocket cost of most medical care low enough, 
despite cost sharing, that the relative price change from obtaining drug coverage (or more 
comprehensive coverage) is not substantial enough to foster an observable substitution effect. 
In other words, the cost of prescription therapy may decline with coverage but not so much 
that individuals rely on them as opposed to other forms of treatment. While the extent to 
which each effect contributed to the overall decline in out-of-pocket health expenditures 
remains uncertain, it is clear from the results of this analysis that Part D was successful in 
driving down individuals’ total health expenditures. If there is an income effect that increases 
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consumption of health care, the increase in costs associated with consuming more of this 
good is not large enough to offset the substantial declines in total health expenditures due to 
prescription coverage.    
This analysis indicates that obtaining prescription drug coverage though Part D nearly 
eliminated the discrepancy in the out-of-pocket health expenditures between the treatment 
and control groups in this analysis. According to the DID results, after controlling for the 
covariates in the model, the out-of-pocket expenditures for Group 1 were, on average, $4,311 
higher for those without prescription drug coverage compared with those in the Control 
group in the pre-treatment period. According to the coefficient in the difference-in-difference 
interaction term, the effect of prescription drug coverage was to reduce this difference by 
$3,105, on average. This suggests that a vast majority of the difference in pretreatment 
differences between the out-of-pocket expenditures for this group were attributable to the 
higher prescription drug costs associated with a lack of drug coverage. This effect is 
significant at the .001 level. A similar interpretation can be applied to the results for Group 2. 
Prior to their enrollment in Part D, they spent, on average, $1,264 more than those in the 
Control group in terms of out-of-pocket medical expenditures. Part D resulted in a decline in 
out-of-pocket medical expenditures for this group relative to the control of $1,145, on 
average. The coefficient on the difference-in-difference estimator for this regression just 
barely misses statistical significance at the .05 level. These results indicate that, in terms of 
cost, Part D represented an improvement both for those without prior coverage and for those 
with prior coverage. The finding that Part D lowered out-of-pocket medical expenditures was 
robust at various levels of expenditures for each group (0<$200,000; 0<100,000; 0<50,000; 
0<$25,000; 0<$10,000; 0<$5,000). At each expenditure level, prescription drug coverage 
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reduced expenditures by a statistically significant amount and almost or entirely eliminated 
the pretreatment differences between the treatment groups and the control group. 
The most important result from the decline in individual health expenditures in 
general and prescription costs in particular, is the reduction in cost-related non-adherence to 
prescription therapy. The decrease in the number of individuals reporting that they were 
forced to cut-back or avoided their prescription regime indicates that Part D successfully 
achieved one of its specific aims: creating access to affordable health care to those Medicare 
beneficiaries in need of prescriptions. It is not surprising that this effect was limited to those 
without coverage prior to Part D because these individuals had the highest rate of non-
adherence due to costs and bore the full cost of their prescription medication prior to 
enrolling in a Part D plan. The 7.9 percentage point reduction in the rate of non-adherence 
more than halved the pretreatment differences in this measure between those who had and 
maintained their coverage in the Control group and those without drug coverage prior to the 
establishment of Part D in Group 1. While differences still remain, the reduction in this 
discrepancy signifies an important achievement in the effort to expand access to this form of 
therapy through drug coverage. Improved adherence to due a reduction in costs may also 
serve as one of the important causal pathways through which the Part D program improves 
individual health.  
The results from this analysis indicate that obtaining prescription drug coverage is 
associated with a decrease in the likelihood that an individual reported a health decline by 4.3 
percentage points, on average. Here again, obtaining prescription drug coverage resulted in a 
convergence of the means for this outcome between Group 1 and the Control. This suggests a 
convergence in the relative rates of health deterioration between those who had coverage and 
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those who recently obtained it through Part D. This result provides evidence that Part D has 
had a positive effect on health outcomes for Medicare beneficiaries and circumstantial 
evidence that prescription drug coverage allows individuals to obtain the prescriptions 
necessary to stabilize their health. Future research may turn towards determining whether the 
likelihood of a negative health shock is reduced after having obtained prescription drug 
coverage.  
In a re-examination of the general health measure employed by Kaestner and Khan 
(2010), this analysis found that Part D had small but positive effects on this outcome. The 
different results may reflect the fact that the estimation samples slightly differ between the 
two analyses. This analysis includes only those who were taking prescriptions regularly prior 
to Part D and may, therefore, include individuals whose health may be more responsive to 
improved access to prescription medications through Part D drug coverage. As noted, the 
estimation strategy of the Kaestner and Khan (2010) study also had limited statistical power 
so it is unlikely that their analysis would observed a small treatment effect like those found in 
this analysis. In this analysis, obtaining drug coverage led, again, to a positive effect on 
health contributing to the convergence of the mean number of individuals in Group 1 
reporting to be in good health with that of the Control group. Combining the results from 
column 4 of Table 5, indicates that in the pretreatment period those in the Control group were 
more likely to report being in good health by 6.7 percentage points, in the post-treatment 
period this difference was nearly zero (6.7 – 6.5 = .02). The Control group appeared to 
continue the downward trend while the rate of decline was reduced for Group 1. Rather than 
interpret this change as an improvement in health, it is seen as a reduction in the rate at which 
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individuals in Group 1 transition from ―good‖ health to ―poor‖ health due to their having 
enrolled in a Part D prescription drug plan.
22
 
This analysis provides evidence that the positive effects of Part D are not limited to 
reducing prescription costs and increasing consumption of prescription drugs. Indeed, Part D 
appears to have had a modest but significant positive effect on the health of the elderly. It is 
plausible that the health effects are the result of increased consumption of prescriptions 
and/or improved adherence to their prescription regimes. Determining whether these 
improvements are sustained and if Part D actually improves mortality rates and the quality of 
life of program enrollees is an interesting area for future research. 
                                                 
22
 I have chosen to interpret the unification of the trend lines as the equalization of the rates of deterioration for 
each group, rather than a health improvement. This interpretation appears most plausible due to the age and 
physical condition of the elderly is the actual effect measured because the estimation sample consists of an 
elderly and/or disabled population whose deterioration is health is evident from the downward slope on the 
percent of those reporting to be in good health over time (Figure 3: ―Percent Reporting Health Declines‖ and 
―Percent Reporting to be in Good Health‖). I suggest that the aging of this sample over time makes it less likely 
that these individuals will respond to increased access to prescription medications through drug coverage with 
improved health and more likely that this access will help equalize the attrition rate of individual health with 
those that already had access to this treatment in the control group. This would suggest that Part D provides a 
one-time positive shock to individual health before resuming it downward trajectory. Proof of this hypothesis 
will require the tracking of these relative trends over time.     
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1: Significant Differences in the Trend Lines between the Treatment and Control Groups, by Year 
Group 1 
    
 
Out-of-Pocket 
Expenditures 
Take Less Rx Health Decline Good Health  
1998 
    2000 + 
   2002 + 
   2004 + + 
  Group 2 
    1998 
    2000 
 
- 
  2002 
 
- 
  2004   - - + 
+  Indicates that trend in the treatment group is increasing more rapidly relative to  
the control group at a statistically significant rate. 
-         Indicates that trend in the treatment group is decreasing more rapidly relative to  
                the control group at a statistically significant rate.  
The models used to predict these differences included the full list of explanatory variables in Table 2 
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Table 2: Variable Means of the Pooled Sample 
  
Dependent Variables (Pooled Sample) Group 1 Group 2   Control   
Possible 
Control  
     Total Out-of-Pocket Expend. 6823 4024 3684 4266 
     Take Less Rx Due to Cost 0.15 0.11 0.03 0.13 
     Health Gotten Worse 0.33 0.35 0.28 0.26 
     Good Health 0.64 0.57 0.73 0.75 
     Explanatory Variables Group 1 Group 2  Control Group  Control Group  
     Age 75 73 74 77 
     BMI 27 28 28 26 
     Mobility 0.93 1.16 0.56 0.76 
     Smoker 0.08 0.11 0.07 0.16 
     Total Assets 175,250 102,000 283,000 
      White 0.87 0.80 0.89 0.91 
     Black 0.11 0.15 0.09 0.08 
     Other 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.01 
     Male 0.35 0.31 0.47 0.36 
     Married 0.58 0.51 0.70 0.53 
     Some High School 0.27 0.34 0.13 0.26 
     High School 0.56 0.46 0.59 0.58 
     Some College 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.06 
     College/Graduate 0.13 0.17 0.24 0.10 
Number of Observations  2402 2042 3972 214 
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Table 3: Likelihood of Enrolling in Part D and Reporting to Take Less Prescriptions Due to Costs 
 
Group 1 Group 2 Group 1 Group 2 
 
Enrolled in Part D  Enrolled in Part D  Take Less Take Less 
Rx Costs Partly Covered  
 
0.222*** 
  
  
(0.017) 
  Take Rx Regularly 0.147*** 
   
 
(0.010) 
   Log(Prescription Costs) 
  
0.024*** 0.031*** 
   
(0.009) (0.009) 
Log(Total Assets) 0.007*** -0.032*** -0.023*** -0.016*** 
 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Age -0.086*** -0.045*** -0.012*** -0.007*** 
 
(0.007) (0.014) (0.001) (0.002) 
Age Squared 0.001*** 0.000*** 
  
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
  Black -0.023** 0.022 0.004 -0.009 
 
(0.010) (0.027) (0.038) (0.038) 
Male -0.030*** -0.079*** -0.064*** -0.004 
 
(0.007) (0.018) (0.024) (0.026) 
Married -0.009 -0.095*** -0.046* -0.022 
 
(0.007) (0.020) (0.025) (0.027) 
Some College -0.014 -0.022 -0.041 -0.015 
 
(0.019) (0.046) (0.057) (0.063) 
College -0.035*** -0.002 -0.056* 0.038 
 
(0.009) (0.021) (0.033) (0.030) 
Good Health -0.006 -0.102*** -0.133*** -0.077*** 
 
(0.007) (0.019) (0.024) (0.025) 
Constant 3.395*** 2.595*** 1.382*** 0.692*** 
 
(0.265) (0.503) (0.113) (0.120) 
Observations 10159 2783 1153 765 
a b
 The outcome is a binary indicator equal to 1 if the individual reported enrolling in Part D in 2006 and 0 otherwise.  
a
 The estimation sample consists of all individuals with and without prescription drug coverage in 2004  
b
 The estimation sample consists of only those who reported having prescription drug coverage in 2004 
c d
 The outcome is a binary indication equal to 1 if the individual reported taking less medications than prescribed to them due to costs and 0 otherwise  
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Table 4:  Regression Results Looking at Differences in Pre-Treatment Trends 
 
PANEL A   
 
  PANEL B 
 
Group 1  
 
  
 
Group 2 
 OOP Medical 
Expenditures 
Take Less Rx 
Due to Cost 
Reports 
Health 
Decline  
Reports Good 
Health 
      OOP Medical 
Expenditures 
Take Less Rx 
Due to Cost 
Reports 
Health 
Decline  
Reports 
Good 
Health 
Treat*2004 4005.3*** 0.0753** 0.0398 -0.0382 
 
  
 
922.2 -0.115** -0.117** 0.103** 
 
(902.137) (0.038) (0.042) (0.041) 
 
  
 
(614.677) (0.051) (0.054) (0.052) 
Treat*2002 1753.1** 0.0469 0.0161 -0.00348 
 
  
 
595.0 -0.113** -0.0923* 0.0705 
 
(694.532) (0.038) (0.043) (0.041) 
 
  
 
(649.841) (0.052) (0.055) (0.053) 
Treat*2000 1399.6** 0.0421 0.0178 -0.0132 
 
  
 
229.4 -0.106** -0.0758 0.0689 
 
(616.208) (0.038) (0.043) (0.042) 
 
  
 
(511.103) (0.052) (0.055) (0.053) 
Treat* 1998 460.9 -0.0166 0.0300 0.0380 
 
  
 
721.1 -0.0944* -0.0487 0.0561 
 
(564.244) (0.038) (0.046) (0.044) 
 
  
 
(564.967) (0.053) (0.058) (0.056) 
Treatment 309.4 0.0611* -0.00182 -0.0333 
 
  
 
316.4 0.172*** 0.134*** -0.163*** 
 
(529.397) (0.036) (0.039) (0.038) 
 
  
 
(454.731) (0.050) (0.051) (0.050) 
2004 1878.0*** 0.0410** 0.132*** -0.146*** 
 
  
 
1790.1*** 0.0247 0.128*** -0.143*** 
 
(337.010) (0.016) (0.026) (0.026) 
 
  
 
(327.207) (0.015) (0.026) (0.027) 
2002 1687.9*** 0.0394** 0.121*** -0.143*** 
 
  
 
1523.4*** 0.0223 0.116*** -0.140*** 
 
(331.067) (0.016) (0.026) (0.026) 
 
  
 
(317.344) (0.015) (0.027) (0.027) 
2000 465.0* 0.0345** 0.0727*** -0.120*** 
 
  
 
245.0 0.0176 0.0675** -0.117*** 
 
(265.506) (0.016) (0.026) (0.026) 
 
  
 
(246.963) (0.015) (0.027) (0.027) 
1998 324.1 0.0227 0.0951*** -0.162*** 
 
  
 
129.7 0.00953 0.0923*** -0.162*** 
 
(260.371) (0.016) (0.028) (0.028) 
 
  
 
(242.884) (0.015) (0.028) (0.029) 
Smoker -576.6** 0.0136 0.0251 -0.0414** 
 
  
 
-262.1 0.0190* 0.0301* -0.0321* 
 
(265.169) (0.011) (0.017) (0.017) 
 
  
 
(256.598) (0.011) (0.018) (0.017) 
Mobility t-1 643.1*** 0.0295*** 0.0751*** -0.110*** 
 
  
 
373.8*** 0.0176*** 0.0750*** -0.114*** 
 
(118.219) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
 
  
 
(76.227) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Overweight 286.8 0.00237 0.00266 0.0158* 
 
  
 
-68.22 -0.00864 -0.00462 0.0139 
 
(234.969) (0.006) (0.010) (0.009) 
 
  
 
(193.969) (0.005) (0.010) (0.009) 
Underweight  -413.1 -0.0383** 0.0556 -0.0596 
 
  
 
-1071.6** 0.0133 0.0995** -0.118*** 
 
(795.930) (0.016) (0.042) (0.039) 
 
  
 
(429.382) (0.024) (0.049) (0.045) 
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Log(Assets) 132.3*** -0.0137*** -0.00569*** 0.0159*** 
 
  
 
229.8*** -0.00624*** -0.00608*** 0.0175*** 
 
(43.219) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
 
  
 
(34.795) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Age -1005.3*** -0.0259*** -0.0569*** 0.121*** 
 
  
 
-326.7** -0.0153** -0.0287*** 0.0714*** 
 
(352.484) (0.007) (0.011) (0.010) 
 
  
 
(163.022) (0.007) (0.011) (0.014) 
Age Sq. 7.046*** 0.000143*** 0.000415*** -0.000809*** 
 
  
 
2.251* 0.0000837* 0.000225*** 
-
0.000474*** 
 
(2.452) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
  
 
(1.163) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Black 252.3 0.0514*** -0.00770 -0.105*** 
 
  
 
400.5 0.0229** -0.0511*** -0.0651*** 
 
(567.078) (0.012) (0.016) (0.017) 
 
  
 
(540.730) (0.011) (0.016) (0.016) 
Male -266.5 -0.0163*** -0.0102 -0.0673*** 
 
  
 
-574.5** -0.00225 -0.00606 -0.0795*** 
 
(240.110) (0.005) (0.009) (0.009) 
 
  
 
(224.514) (0.005) (0.010) (0.010) 
Married -274.6 -0.0108 0.0204* -0.00216 
 
  
 
291.7 -0.00180 0.0215* -0.00576 
 
(311.868) (0.007) (0.011) (0.010) 
 
  
 
(254.170) (0.007) (0.012) (0.011) 
Some 
College 371.5 0.00860 -0.0102 0.0272 
 
  
 
1165.2 -0.00436 -0.0114 0.0247 
 
(668.896) (0.015) (0.024) (0.021) 
 
  
 
(793.514) (0.014) (0.027) (0.024) 
College 396.1 0.000520 0.00149 0.0602*** 
 
  
 
301.7 0.00165 -0.00601 0.0617*** 
 
(315.786) (0.005) (0.011) (0.009) 
 
  
 
(198.566) (0.005) (0.012) (0.010) 
Constant 35084.8*** 1.252*** 2.044*** -3.628*** 
 
  
 
10372.2* 0.730*** 1.023*** -1.835*** 
 
(12711.433) (0.274) (0.396) (0.370) 
 
  
 
(5742.363) (0.258) (0.387) (0.513) 
N = 9218 9025 9211 9215 
 
  
 
8078 7929 8072 8074 
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Table 5: Difference-in-Difference Regressions   
 
PANEL A   
 
  PANEL B 
 
Group 1  
 
  
 
Group 2 
 OOP Medical 
Expenditures 
Take Less 
Rx Due to 
Cost 
Reports 
Health 
Decline  
Reports 
Good 
Health 
      OOP Medical 
Expenditures 
Take Less 
Rx Due to 
Cost 
Reports 
Health 
Decline  
Reports 
Good 
Health 
Treatment 4,311*** 0.144*** 0.038** -0.067*** 
 
  
 
1,263.9*** 0.059*** 0.019 -0.047*** 
 
(741.533) (0.011) (0.017) (0.015) 
 
  
 
(443.983) (0.011) (0.019) (0.018) 
Post -447.2 0.012** -0.008 -0.041*** 
 
  
 
-207.6 0.011* -0.009 -0.038*** 
 
(330.969) (0.006) (0.014) (0.013) 
 
  
 
(318.083) (0.006) (0.014) (0.013) 
Treatment*Post -3,105*** -0.079*** -0.043* 0.065*** 
 
  
 
-1,145* -0.015 0.012 0.020 
 
(862.793) (0.015) (0.024) (0.022) 
 
  
 
(595.436) (0.015) (0.025) (0.023) 
Smoker -483.5 0.029** 0.048** -0.083*** 
 
  
 
-271.3 0.006 0.050** -0.051** 
 
(406.767) (0.015) (0.023) (0.022) 
 
  
 
(376.274) (0.013) (0.022) (0.021) 
Mobility t-1 1,020.7*** 0.024*** 0.080*** -0.116*** 
 
  
 
509.9*** 0.016*** 0.075*** -0.116*** 
 
(181.606) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) 
 
  
 
(111.185) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) 
Overweight 381.3 0.006 -0.017 0.028** 
 
  
 
-233.1 0.001 -0.010 0.018 
 
(354.416) (0.007) (0.012) (0.011) 
 
  
 
(319.700) (0.006) (0.013) (0.012) 
Underweight  1955.0 -0.006 0.063 -0.098** 
 
  
 
318.247 0.015 0.127** -0.173*** 
 
(1,479.940) (0.020) (0.049) (0.047) 
 
  
 
(1,104.894) (0.024) (0.051) (0.048) 
Log(Total Assets) 112.2 -0.009*** -0.008*** 0.013*** 
 
  
 
224.1*** -0.009*** -0.006*** 0.015*** 
 
(94.248) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
 
  
 
(37.705) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Age -965.0** -0.006*** -0.036*** 0.036*** 
 
  
 
-699.4*** -0.004*** -0.013 0.031** 
 
(404.207) (0.001) (0.013) (0.013) 
 
  
 
(253.570) (0.001) (0.012) (0.012) 
Age Squared 7.0** 
 
0.000*** -0.000** 
 
  
 
5.1*** 
 
0.000 -0.000** 
 
(2.713) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
  
 
(1.765) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Black 217.0 0.052*** -0.049** -0.062*** 
 
  
 
335.4 0.009 -0.089*** -0.035* 
 
(830.308) (0.014) (0.019) (0.020) 
 
  
 
(742.802) (0.012) (0.019) (0.020) 
Other -933.6* 0.037 0.018 -0.054 
 
  
 
-1,366.4*** -0.024 -0.075** -0.013 
 
(565.686) (0.028) (0.042) (0.042) 
 
  
 
(420.408) (0.021) (0.036) (0.035) 
Male -177.8 -0.010 0.016 -0.089*** 
 
  
 
-441.0 0.003 0.015 -0.087*** 
 
(344.671) (0.007) (0.012) (0.011) 
 
  
 
(290.798) (0.006) (0.013) (0.012) 
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Married -726.4 -0.020** 0.006 0.031** 
 
  
 
-295.7 -0.001 0.009 0.015 
 
(447.672) (0.008) (0.014) (0.013) 
 
  
 
(330.561) (0.007) (0.014) (0.013) 
High School 993.7* 0.005 -0.020 0.118*** 
 
  
 
655.590* 0.012 -0.015 0.093*** 
 
(516.960) (0.010) (0.016) (0.016) 
 
  
 
(397.379) (0.010) (0.017) (0.017) 
Some College 170.4 0.006 -0.076** 0.131*** 
 
  
 
1158.8 -0.009 -0.090*** 0.089*** 
 
(681.955) (0.019) (0.033) (0.030) 
 
  
 
(717.625) (0.015) (0.033) (0.032) 
College 2,047.0*** 0.006 -0.029 0.170*** 
 
  
 
1,448.4*** 0.022** -0.042** 0.138*** 
 
(698.334) (0.011) (0.020) (0.019) 
 
  
 
(456.643) (0.011) (0.020) (0.019) 
Constant 33,653.3** 0.554*** 1.533*** -0.798 
 
  
 
23,903.3*** 0.405*** 0.596 -0.568 
 
(15,172.353) (0.049) (0.497) (0.489) 
 
  
 
(9,029.592) (0.045) (0.436) (0.457) 
Observations 6087 6085 6085 6083 
 
  
 
5757 5755 5752 5754 
R-Squared 0.032 0.127 0.084 0.208 
 
  
 
0.018 0.073 0.084 0.227 
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   Figure 1. 
 
Source: Kaiser Family Foundation: Presciption Drug Trends (2010). Data were taken from the National Health Expenditure 
Data. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services.    
 
Figure 2. 
 
Source: Data complied from the National Health Expenditure Data. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. 2009  
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Figure 3: Validity Check 
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CHAPTER 3 
FINANCIAL LITERACY AND PENSION ACTIVITY AMONG THE ELDERLY 
Introduction  
Researchers have increasingly focused their attention on establishing and analyzing 
the link between financial literacy and sub-optimal financial decision-making (Lusardi and 
Mitchell 2011). The theme undergirding much of this research is that individuals are not 
sufficiently informed to behave optimally and maximize their welfare which, in turn, leads to 
a number of welfare reducing mistakes including under-saving for retirement, under-
annuitizing their wealth upon retirement, holding undiversified portfolios, and failing to 
refinance a mortgage (Campbell 2006; Brown 2007; Lusardi and Mitchell 2007). From this 
perspective, it follows that increasing financial sophistication through financial literacy will 
lead individuals to make more informed economic choices. Therefore, it is important to first, 
establish whether the financial literacy is actually associated with what are commonly viewed 
as better financial decisions.   
This paper will employ a financial literacy index to explore the relationship between 
financial literacy and three different retirement-related financial decisions: the timing of an 
individual’s decision to claim their Social Security benefits, the level of ―time 
diversification‖ within their portfolios, and how actively they manage their defined 
contribution pension accounts. Each of these outcomes has important implications for the 
financial well-being and exposure to financial risk for workers in, or approaching retirement. 
While failing to minimize risk exposure through informed investment and Social Security 
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claiming decisions will not, necessarily, lead to suboptimal outcomes, poor economic 
choices can increase the financial risks associated with retirement.  
This paper builds on the existing body of research within the financial literacy field 
by analyzing the relationship between this construct and three outcomes that have yet to be 
analyzed within the field: Social Security claiming behavior, the extent to which households 
age-weight their financial portfolio—referred to as being time diversified—and pension 
activity. Like other analyses in this field, the financial literacy index is comprised of 
responses to financial questions that are either correct or incorrect. In contrast, previous 
studies have frequently relied on indices constructed from a mix of factual and subjective 
components such as individual sentiment that may not reveal much about the individuals 
actual level of financial sophistication (Hung, Meijer, Mihaly, and Yoong 2009; Kimball and 
Shumway 2010).
23
  
Financial Literacy 
As the review by Huston (2010) makes clear, financial literacy is a construct without 
a common definition; however, the literature consistently demonstrates that a substantial 
share of the population cannot perform the basic economic calculations and lack an 
understanding of simple financial concepts typically used to define this measure (Lusardi 
2008; Lusardi, Mitchell and Curto 2009; Kimball and Shumway 2010). Large majorities of 
individuals are unable to perform basic interest and debt-related calculations like those 
associated with a credit card balance (Lusardi and Mitchell 2007; Lusardi and Tufano 2009). 
Many people are unable to correctly identify appropriate financial behaviors or fully 
                                                 
23
 These questions may ask the respondent to respondent with ―True‖ or ―False‖ to a statement like the 
following: ―I can usually tell when it is a good time to buy or sell a stock. These questions do not measure 
objective knowledge but a person’s subjective sense of their own known knowledge. This may be problematic 
because individuals have been shown to over-estimate what they actually know with respect to financial matters 
(OECD 2005).  
  
94 
 
comprehend the consequences of certain financial decisions (Hilgert, Hogarth, and Beverly 
2003). Individuals also appear to be exceedingly uninformed with respect to financial 
markets as a substantial share of individuals are unable to identify fundamental financial 
concepts such as diversification and fail to grasp even the basics about investment risk or 
asset prices (Kimball and Shumway 2010; Lusardi, Mitchell and Curto 2009; Lusardi and 
Mitchell 2007; van Rooji, Lusardi and Alessie 2007).  
The apparent lack of financial literacy documented in these studies has potentially 
important implications for understanding financial decision-making as well as financial 
outcomes for individuals. As Willis (2011) points out however, there is no causal link 
between financial literacy and improved financial outcomes but financial literacy does appear 
to be positively correlated with better financial behaviors and more informed decision-
making. Lusardi and Mitchell (2009 and 2007) found that the financially literate are more 
likely to have planned for retirement and were more likely to have higher levels of wealth. 
The financially literate are also more likely to participate in the stock market and their 
company’s pension plan as well as engage in sophisticated investment behaviors (van Rooji, 
Lusardi and Alessie 2007; Goetzmann and Kumar 2008; Agnew, Szykman, Utkus and Young 
2011). Hilgert, Hogarth and Beverly (2003) found that the financially literate were more 
likely to engage in better financial management behaviors and were more likely to save and 
invest for the future. Scholars have also shown that a lack of financial literacy is associated 
with higher debt loads and a higher likelihood of borrowing from a pension plan to cover 
current expenses (Lusardi and Tufano 2009; Agnew, Szykman, Utkus and Young 2011).  
This analysis will attempt to build on the existing research and analyze the 
relationship between three different financial decisions related to retirement: the timing of 
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their decision to claim their Social Security benefits, the distribution of their assets within 
their household portfolio, and whether they are more likely to have ever changed the assets 
within their defined contribution plan. 
Social Security Claiming Behavior  
Social Security represents one of the largest and most important social policy 
programs in the United States. Individuals pay into the Social Security system throughout 
their working lives and receive a monthly benefit, the amount of which is determined, in part, 
by the lifetime earnings of the individual. The program is intended to keep senior citizens out 
of poverty after they have transitioned out of the labor force and into retirement. The most 
recent estimates from the Social Security Administration (2011) indicate that Social Security 
covers nine out of ten individuals over the age of 65 and serves as the primary source of 
income for 63 percent of elderly households (65 and over) living in the United States. 
Those eligible to participate in this program may begin to claim benefits as early as age 
62 but may also elect to defer receiving them until age 70. The age at which an individual 
decides to claim their Social Security benefits affects their monthly benefit level. Individual 
benefit levels are determined by the earnings history of the individual but this benefit can be 
further reduced or increased depending on the age at which an individual files to begin 
receiving their benefits.  
An individual will receive a permanent reduction in their monthly benefit level if they 
claim their benefits prior to their ―Full Retirement Age‖ (FRA) and a permanent increase in 
their monthly benefit level for delaying the decision to claim their benefits until after their 
FRA. An individual’s FRA is set by the Social Security Administration and determined by 
the year in which that individual was born (see Table 1). The penalty for claiming prior to 
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one’s FRA is clear from column 5 of Table 1, where for example, the FRA for a person born 
in 1950 is age 66. If a man eligible for Social Security was born in 1950 were to claim his 
benefits at age 62, his monthly retirement benefit would be reduced by 25 percent.
24
 
Alternatively, if he were to wait until he was 70 to claim his benefits, he would receive a 32 
percent increase in his monthly benefit (column 7 in Table 1 and Figure 1). In other words, 
when age 62 is used as the reference point, the benefit level of this individual increases each 
month that he delays claiming his Social Security benefits past this point. For this particular 
individual, the share of his total benefit would increase by .56 percentage points per month 
past turning 62 until he turned 65, at which point the share would increase by roughly .42 
percentage points per month until he reached his FRA of 66 whereupon he would receive his 
full benefit. His benefit level would continue to increase as a share of his full benefit by 
roughly .67 percentage points for each month he continues to delay claiming his benefits past 
his FRA until he turns age 70.     
As this example illustrates, the benefit structure with respect to the timing of the Social 
Security claiming decision allows individuals to choose between receiving a smaller benefit 
for a longer period of time or a larger benefit for a shorter period of time. However, the 
Social Security Administration states that, in general, the timing of this decision will result in 
the approximately the same total level of benefits over the lifetime of the individual which is 
true for those workers with average life expectancies (Sass, Sun and Webb 2007; Meyer and 
Reichenstein 2010). For these individuals the changes in Social Security benefit levels 
associated with the timing of the claiming decision do not significantly alter the expected 
present value of their benefits because the reductions and increases associated with the 
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 The size of this penalty increases for later generations such that a person born in 1960 would have their 
monthly benefit reduced by 30 percent.  
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timing of their decision are actuarially fair.  Therefore, once eligible, the timing of their 
claiming decision will not have a substantial affect (positive or negative) on the total amount 
of benefits they can expect to receive from the program over time. The same cannot be said 
for those with anything other than an average life expectancy. For these individuals, the 
timing of their claiming decision will determine the total amount of benefits they can expect 
to receive (the expected present value) as well as help determine their exposure to longevity 
risk, that is, the risk of outliving their assets. Those individuals with short life expectancies 
would benefit from claiming Social Security before their FRA, and those with long life 
expectancies benefit from delaying their claiming decision (See Table 2). 
Social Security Claiming Behavior and Financial Literacy 
While it is impossible to know the optimal age at which one should initiate their Social 
Security benefits, individuals can make more informed decisions by incorporating their 
individual-specific circumstances such as life expectancy, stock of wealth, time preferences, 
and marital and employment status into their decision. The data however, indicate that an 
overwhelming and increasing majority of individuals are not adjusting their claiming 
decision to accommodate changing circumstances. For example, in 2009, 74 percent of 
Social Security beneficiaries received a reduced benefit due to their decision to claim their 
benefits before their FRA; this figure is up 20 percent since 1980 while, over the same 
period, the average life expectancy at age 65 has increased by 13 percent (2.2 years) 
(National Center for Health Statistics 2011; Social Security Administration 2011). If 
individuals were actually integrating changes in their expected longevity into their claiming 
decision, one would expect the percentage of those receiving reduced benefits to be 
negatively correlated with longevity. The fact that individuals are living longer and claiming 
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Social Security benefits earlier calls into question whether individuals are being rational with 
respect to the timing of their claiming decision.  
While these trends provide only circumstantial evidence that many individuals are not 
maximizing their benefit, researchers have come to similar conclusions in more formal 
analyses of data collected from Social Security beneficiaries.  Coile, Diamond, Gruber, and 
Jousten (2002) found that the prevalence of delay in the claiming decision is much lower 
than estimates from theoretical models would suggest. They used single households and one-
earner couples to demonstrate that the decision to delay claiming Social Security benefits is 
optimal under various circumstances and doing so can result in large increases in an 
individual’s total and monthly benefit level. By contrast, those that claim their benefits prior 
to their FRA, stand to lose thousands of dollars worth of Social Security benefits (Meyer and 
Reichenstein 2010; Sass et al., 2007). Married households would also be substantially better-
off by delaying their Social Security benefits as they could smooth their consumption over 
the duration of their retirement and increase the survivor benefit of elderly widows (Sun and 
Webb 2009). Sun and Webb (2009) also estimate that a large minority of these couples have 
sufficient financial assets to fund their consumption while delaying their receipt of Social 
Security benefits from 62 to 66 (46 percent of married households) and 62 to 68 (40 percent) 
suggesting that many of those who choose to receive their benefits early are not doing so out 
of necessity.   
Models based on standard economic theories cannot sufficiently explain why so many 
claim their benefits early when it is neither rational nor welfare maximizing. A more 
satisfying explanation may come from the literature on behavioral economics and financial 
literacy. The former is a sub-field of economics devoted, in large part, to the identification 
  
99 
 
and explanation of observed financial behavior that systematically deviates from the 
expectations of standard economic models. Researchers in this field have found that 
individuals are often unwilling or unable to make the welfare maximizing decision when 
their choice involves uncertainty (Thaler 1985; Benartzi and Thaler 2007; Choi, Laibson, 
Madrian 2011; Choi, Laibson, Madrian 2010; Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and Metrick 2006). In 
the presence of uncertainty, their financial behavior is frequently motivated by heuristics, or 
biases (such as loss aversion), and lead to preferences being easily manipulated by the 
―framing‖ of the information presented to the individual (Tversky and Kahneman 1974). The 
findings from this field are inconsistent with the expectations of the standard economic 
model populated with fully rational, welfare maximizing individuals who have stable and 
well-defined preferences.  
Researchers have, therefore, recommended that, where possible, public policies be 
designed so that they unobtrusively correct the welfare reducing behavior of individuals by 
incorporating such behavior into the policy design (Thaler and Sunstein 2008). The most 
successful of such policies has demonstrated that adjusting the default setting of individual 
enrollment in their company’s pension plan and their savings amount over time can increase 
pension plan participation and saving rates (Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and Metrick 2006; 
Thaler and Benartzi 2004). By allowing for automated enrollment and adjustments in saving 
rates, these policies exploit tendency of individuals towards inertia and procrastination to 
increase their pension plan participation and increase individual saving rates.  
With respect to Social Security claiming behavior, Brown, Kapteyn, and Mitchell (2011) 
found that an individual’s expected claiming date was highly responsive to how claiming 
information was framed. They provide evidence that the ―breakeven analysis‖ used by the 
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Social Security Administration (SSA) to explain to individuals how their benefit level will 
vary depending on the timing of their claiming decision. When explaining the difference 
between claiming at, say, age 62 and 63, the SSA would describe the decision to delay until 
63 as a forfeiture of the benefits that the individual would have otherwise received by 
claiming at age 62. The SSA would also include information detailing how long it would take 
the individual to ―breakeven‖ from their decision to defer to their claiming decision to, in this 
example, age 63 over age 62. The individual is said to break even at the point when he/she 
has lived long enough under the higher payment schedule from claiming at 63 to account for 
one year loss of benefits from not claiming at age 62. This method of explanation is thought 
to increase the rate at which individuals claim early because it emphasizes the losses from 
delaying their decision and conditions recouping those losses upon an uncertain survival to a 
specific time period. This possibility draws upon one of the most robust findings from the 
field of behavioral economics, mainly, that individuals prefer a benefit that is certain over 
one that is uncertain due to ―loss aversion‖ (Khaneman and Tversky 1974’; Benartzi and 
Thaler 1995). Brown, Kapteyn, and Mitchell (2011) apply these concepts to Social Security 
information and show that by avoiding framing the information as the loss of the benefits 
from delaying their claiming decision and emphasizing, instead, the gain from a higher 
monthly benefit, the SSA may be able to reduce the number of individuals that claim early.   
In addition to modifications in the design of certain policies, the idea of improving 
financial literacy has become an increasing popular field of inquiry among researchers 
interested in understanding economic behavior. Financial literacy has been shown to reduce 
individuals’ tendency towards welfare-reducing biases and non-rational financial behavior 
(Feng and Seasholes 2005; Liu, Wang, and Zhao 2010; Choi, Laibson, and Madrian 2011; 
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Brown, Kapteyn, and Mitchell 2011). These studies suggest that financially literate 
individuals are less susceptible to welfare-reducing biases and tend to behave more rationally 
when making financially-related decisions. It is impossible to determine whether this 
apparent relationship is causal, but it is possible to formulate plausible hypotheses regarding 
the causal pathways through which such an effect may operate. Financial literacy may help 
reduce some of the complexity and search costs associated with financial decision-making 
and reduce the uncertainty that may otherwise lead individuals to act on their non-rational 
behavioral impulses, cognitive biases, or misguided heuristics. The financially literate may 
be better able to identify important economic information and incorporate the relevant facts 
into their decision and reach a consistent conclusion regardless of the manner in which they 
are presented. This interpretation would help explain why the behavior of the financially 
literate appear to be less responsive to the framing with respect to anticipated claiming dates 
and the frames employed by Brown, Kapteyn, and Mitchell (2011). If the financially literate 
are less susceptible to framing effects and the current frame employed by the Social Security 
Administration actually increases the likelihood of claiming early, then one might expect that 
the financially literate would be less likely to claim their benefits early.  
It is, however, unclear whether, or the extent to which, Social Security factors into 
household saving decisions and their plans for retirement. Given the importance of Social 
Security income to retired households, one would expect that the timing of benefit receipt 
and benefit levels would be central to many, if not most, most retirement-related planning 
and saving decisions. However, the evidence suggests that very few people are adequately 
informed with respect to their Social Security benefits. Combining data from the Social 
Security Administration and the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), Gustman and 
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Steinmeier (2005) reported that only 27 percent of those approaching retirement were able 
provide an estimate of their anticipated Social Security benefit within 75 to 125 percent of 
their actual benefit level. Almost three quarters either ―did not know‖ what they could expect 
to receive from Social Security in retirement or provided an estimate that either grossly 
under- or over-estimated their actual benefit. The results from a survey conducted by the 
Helman, Greenwald, VanDerhei, and Copeland (2007) found that only 18 percent of workers 
were able to correctly identify their FRA. In a related study, Clark, Morrill, and Allen (2010) 
also found that only a small minority knew the rate at which their benefits would be reduced 
as a result of claiming their benefits before their FRA and it was clear to roughly half of 
those surveyed were aware that this penalty was permanent.
25
  
In an effort to educate workers about their benefits, the SSA began distributing annual 
Social Security statements to all workers eligible for the program in 1995. These statements 
detailed the different benefit levels the worker could expect to receive at different claiming 
ages. However, these statements do not appear to have impacted the claiming patterns or 
expected claiming age of individual’s eligible for Social Security (Mastrobuoni 2011). It is 
not clear, however, whether knowledge of the Social Security program varies according to 
financial literacy. Gustman, Steinmeier, and Tabatabai (2010) found that general cognition 
does not appear to predict whether individuals are aware of their Social Security benefits; 
though general cognition is a separate construct from financial literacy that does not measure 
the same type of subject-specific knowledge that may be more relevant to understanding the 
type of relationships within their study. Only one study obtained by this author touched upon 
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 Their estimates were not based on nationally representative sample of individuals. They were drawn from 
individuals employed at three large firms in North Carolina. Their sample is more educated than the general 
population and it is likely, therefore, that they understate the lack of knowledge individuals possess regarding 
their Social Security benefits at the national level.   
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this relationship. Chan and Stevens (2008) established that well-informed individuals are 
more responsive to their pension incentives for retirement at specific ages due to the structure 
of their plan and that, instead of being unresponsive, individuals that are misinformed 
regarding those incentives respond to their incorrect perceptions of them. Again, being ―well-
informed‖ with respect to one’s pension is not the same as being financially literate, but it 
does suggests that those that understand their pensions are more likely to take advantage of 
the incentives within in them and if the financially literate are better informed of their 
benefits and the incentive structure associated with the timing of their claiming decision in 
the Social Security program, they may be more likely to delay their decision. As financial 
literacy appears to be associated with more constructive retirement-related behavior, higher 
levels of wealth, and less debt, it may also allow individuals to understand, or actually 
estimate, the consequences of early claiming decisions using the information provided by the 
Social Security Administration.  
Financial literacy may also simply result in a backwards adjustment in an individual’s 
subjective time preferences. Education is considered an important determinant of individual 
time preferences, and those with more education have been shown to have lower personal 
discount rates that measure the rate at which an individual trades current for future benefits 
(Becker and Mulligan 1997; Warner and Pleeter 2001; Hansel and Deichert 2008; Tanaka, 
Camerer, and Nguyen 2010). In other words, more highly educated individuals tend to be 
more patient and place a lower premium on the immediacy of specific benefits. While the 
relationship between education and personal discount rates is likely endogenous (Meier and 
Springer 2007), there is evidence indicating a causal relationship (Perez-Arce 2011). Like 
education, financial literacy may also affect an individual’s time preferences because it is 
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simply a more specific form of education. Indeed, the subject matter that often composes this 
concept can frequently stress the importance of patience and self-control with long-run 
investment vehicles and due to extended investment time horizons. One can reasonably 
argue, then, that the timing of individuals’ claiming decisions are determined, in part, by their 
subjective time preferences and that financial literacy would contribute to the establishment 
of these time preferences and help individuals align their time preferences with their 
individuals-specific circumstances, which for most people would result in a later claiming 
date.  
Therefore, analysis will test whether financial literacy is associated with a longer 
delay in the date at which an individual claims his/her Social Security benefits after 
becoming eligible.  
Hypothesis 1:  The more financially literate will delay claiming 
their benefits for a longer period of time after becoming 
eligible for Social Security. 
Asset Allocation within Household Portfolios  
A second important source of income in retirement comes from the financial wealth a 
household accumulates prior to old age. A household’s financial portfolio typically consists 
of personal savings (any amount in a savings, checking, certificate of deposit, or a money 
market account), retirement savings (IRA’s, defined contribution plans, defined benefit 
plans), and any investment in stocks or bonds. Using data from the 2007 Survey of Consumer 
Finances, Bucks, Kennickell, Mach, and Moore (2009) found that financial assets 
represented roughly 34 percent of a household’s total assets. Their estimates indicate that 
among those households approaching retirement age, the median value of financial assets 
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totaled $72,000. The analysis by Bricker, Bucks, Kennickell, Mach, and Moore (2011) 
suggest that the specific values from Bucks et al. (2009) may have declined since the onset of 
the recent recession but the importance of these assets to the financial security of a household 
in retirement remains. Thus, it is important that households competently manage their assets 
over their lifetimes.  
One of the most important ways in which a household can insure themselves against 
substantial losses is to diversify the assets within their financial portfolio. The Securities and 
Exchange Commission website defines diversification as the practice of spreading of money 
among different investments to reduce risk, limit losses and reduce the fluctuations of 
investment returns.
26
 They explain that a portfolio should be diversified both between asset 
categories (stocks and bonds) and within asset categories (different types of stocks and 
bonds). A related concept is that of ―time diversification‖ and it refers to how investors 
should ―rebalance‖ their asset mix over time to keep their investment risk in alignment with 
their investment horizon or age-weight their asset mix. Asset diversification and time 
diversification are similar concepts with the distinction of a time component. This part of the 
discussion will focus both on how well diversified individuals are between asset classes 
(asset diversification) and on whether households appear to align their risk exposure with 
their investment horizon (time diversification).  
As Markowitz (1991) explained, a well-balanced portfolio should provide the 
investor with ―protections and opportunities with respect to a wide range of contingencies.‖ 
Asset diversification maintains that individuals should invest in a mix of assets whose 
performances are uncorrelated or inversely correlated with one another. For instance, the 
performance of stocks and bonds are thought to be inversely correlated or at least 
                                                 
26
 http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/assetallocation.htm 
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uncorrelated with one another. When stocks are performing well, the demand for bonds is 
typically low and vice versa. Owning both types of assets allows a household to protect 
against substantial losses under various market conditions. Time diversification, on the other 
hand, is predicated on the assumption that stocks are less risky over longer investment 
horizons. Younger workers have more years or decades to wait out economic contractions 
and market volatility, so they may benefit from riskier, more volatile investments in a 
portfolio more heavily weighted towards stocks and stock funds. Conversely, those that are 
retired or near-retirement ages have relatively less time remaining in the labor market, lower 
human capital, and shorter life expectancies and therefore, should transition out of stocks and 
stock funds towards more conservative assets such as bonds and money market funds as they 
approach retirement. Maintaining an adequately diversified portfolio over time will require 
that households frequently, or even occasionally, ―rebalance‖ their portfolios when their asset 
allocation becomes out of alignment with the household investment horizon.  
Theoretical models developed in the literature on portfolio choice over the life cycle, 
support the popular advice that it is optimal for the fraction of an individual’s portfolio 
invested in equities to fall with age (Horneff, Maurer, Mitchell, and Stamos 2008). 
Researchers in this field have found that individuals lacking a bequest motive would 
maximize their welfare by putting most or all of their assets into less risky annuities upon 
retirement (Yaari 1965; Davidoff, Brown, and Diamond 2005).
27
 These studies found that 
through annuitization, consumers could increase their lifetime consumption and insure them 
against negative shocks to their wealth and longevity risk—the risk of outliving their assets. 
                                                 
27
 Annuities are not entirely risk-free as inflation can erode the value of a fixed payment over time. Many of the 
studies in this field have added inflation and other factors thought to suppress the demand for annuities only to 
find that it is still optimal in most cases for most individuals (Brown 2003; Davidoff, Brown, Diamond 2005; 
Mitchell, Poterba, Warshawsky and Brown 1999). Also, there are annuities available that adjust the benefit 
amount to account for annual inflation. 
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However, there is also potential cost associated with in avoiding riskier assets under longer 
investment horizons as these assets tend to pay a risk premium in the form of higher returns. 
Retirement plan participants with accounts that do not invest in riskier assets do not capture 
the higher premium paid on those risky assets and could, therefore, lower their lifetime 
income. It is up to the individual to balance the need for higher income through the risk 
premium in their younger years through more exposure to the stock market and riskier assets 
with the need for income security and insurance against negative shocks to asset prices with 
their age and a shorter investment horizon. One way to accomplish this is to calibrate the 
distribution of risky and risk-free assets within their portfolio as they age, otherwise known 
as time diversification.   
While financial experts and investment advisors suggest that individuals decrease 
their exposure to the stock market as they age, there is no universal standard by which 
individuals should time diversify their investments between asset classes. The rule of thumb 
is that the a percentage of an individual’s investments held bonds and other less risky assets 
should equal one’s age, but as life expectancies differ between individuals so too will 
individual investment horizons (Ameriks and Zeldas 2004; Agnew, Balduzzi, and Sunden 
2003). Thus, for most, this principle serves more too approximate rather than dictate the level 
of diversification in a particular portfolio. 
At first glance, the empirical evidence on the investment patterns of households is, for 
the most part, consistent with the expectations of these models and the advice of investment 
professionals. Studies relying on cross-sectional data indicate a negative relationship between 
age and the share of their wealth held in stocks (Bodie and Crane 2000; VanDehei, Holden 
and Alonso 2009). Others have found evidence of a non-linear, hump-shape relationship 
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between age and equity share, where households increase the equity share of their portfolio 
during their working lives and then, upon reaching retirement age, move towards safer assets 
(Yoo 1994; Heaton and Lucas 2000; Agnew, Balduzzi and Sunden 2003). These authors 
were drawing these conclusions from equity share means estimated from cross-sectional data 
for each age within a particular year. This method of estimation discounts the possibility of 
unaccounted for heterogeneity between different age cohorts with respect to the propensity to 
own stocks and to invest heavily in them. (Ameriks and Zeldas 2004). The decision of 
younger individuals to hold more equities may be less a function of age than of cohort-
specific preferences or circumstances. For example, younger cohorts may be more affected 
by the transition from defined benefit to defined contribution plans and therefore may be 
more likely to use the stock market as a vehicle to save for retirement or older generations 
may be less inclined to invest the stock market after having lived through the Great 
Depression.  
Ameriks and Zeldas (2004) attempt to account for the possibility of cohort 
heterogeneity by analyzing the relationship between age and asset allocation using panel data 
from a large financial services provider. They suggest that declines in the equity share of 
individual financial portfolios over time, which were found in previous studies, are explained 
by the declining likelihood that an individual owns any stock as they age. They found that, 
conditional on stock ownership, individuals actually increased the equity share within their 
portfolios over time regardless of age. They explained that the observed increase was likely 
due to an overall rise in stock values coupled with inactive portfolio management on the part 
of households. Their results indicate that individuals are likely to exit the stock market 
entirely, but among those not exiting, there is no reduction in the equity share of their 
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portfolio. These findings indicate that stock market exit rather than portfolio equity share is a 
function of age and that equity share is, instead, a function of market conditions and passive 
portfolio management.   
Looking specifically at the assets within defined contribution plans, Yamaguchi, 
Mitchell, Mottola, and Utkus (2007) found that only about 10 percent of plan participants 
either actively or passively rebalance their assets. Those that actively rebalance their 
accounts personally recalibrate the equity exposure of their portfolio and those that passively 
rebalance their account rely on ―lifecycle funds‖ that automatically adjust their equity 
exposure downward as the investor ages. Yamaguchi et al. (2007) found that those that 
passively rebalance their accounts through age-adjusted lifecycle funds earned the highest 
risk-adjusted returns. Lifecycle funds operate on the principle implied by time 
diversification, automatically decreasing the investor’s exposure to risky assets, such as 
equities, as they age and their findings imply that investors stand to gain from time 
diversifying their assets.  
While investors appear to gain from holding diversified portfolios—time, asset, or 
otherwise—the evidence indicates that investors typically hold under-diversified financial 
portfolios. Individuals have been shown to favor single asset classes, many investing all of 
their pensions in either stocks or bonds (Agnew, Balduzzi and Suden 2003). The same 
behavior is evident within asset classes as many investors often hold only a single mutual 
fund or concentrate all of their assets in the stock of only a handful of companies (Barber and 
Odean 2000; Polkovnichenko 2005; Goetzmann and Kumar 2008). Often times, these 
companies are limited to those located within the same country or region in which investor 
lives (French and Poterba 1991; Huberman 2001). Others hold large amounts of their 
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employer’s stock in their pension funds creating a potentially dangerous positive correlation 
between their pension fund and their job security (Benartzi 2001; Mitchell and Utkus 2002). 
Even among those attempting to diversify their portfolios, many do so ―naively‖, often by 
simply spreading their assets evenly among the available investment options or among a 
small group of investments (Benartzi and Thaler 2001; Huberman and Jiang 2006).  
Financial Literacy, Asset Allocation and Time Diversification   
The lack of time diversification and rebalancing may be due to a lack of investment 
knowledge whereby individuals do not know the appropriate actions to take in order to 
implement a coherent diversification investment strategy. Under-diversification may also be 
the result of a behavioral predisposition towards passive decision-making. While the 
pathways are not entirely clear, being financially literate may provide individuals with a 
familiarity with basic concepts investment concepts as well as the confidence to implement 
them. It may also help suppress the compulsion towards investment-related behavioral 
biases. While this analysis cannot disentangle the two effects, to the extent that it exists, this 
study will attempt to measure the total effect of financial literacy on the level of time 
diversification within individual portfolios. 
Hypothesis 2: The more financially literate will be more likely 
to hold a time diversified, or age-weighted, portfolio.  
 Inertia within Defined Contribution plans 
For most households, retirement assets represent the largest component of their 
financial asset portfolio (Bricker, Bucks, Kennickell, Mach, and Moore (2011). Most pension 
assets are invested in defined contribution plans which have supplanted defined benefit plans 
as the predominant form of private pension offered by employers. Almost 78 percent of those 
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currently employed and covered by a pension plan are enrolled in a defined contribution plan 
rather than a defined benefit plan (Department of Labor 2010). Those enrolled in defined 
contribution plans are responsible for making all the decisions affecting investments in their 
pension account over time, such as how much to invest and how their funds are distributed 
within and between different asset classes. This marks an important departure from the once 
dominant defined benefit plans that were administered by the employer, who also assumed 
all the investment risk associated with the assets in the firm’s plan. Investment decisions are 
complicated and they are increasingly being made by workers under defined contribution 
plans rather than professionals that were frequently hired by employers to manage their 
defined-benefit pension assets (Gale, Papek, and VanDerhei 2005). For most workers 
covered by defined contribution plans, their investment decisions are critical for establishing 
their financial security in retirement. Individuals who are not confident in their ability to 
make wise investment decisions may avoid them completely. If workers are to be responsible 
for managing their retirement assets, policy makers should understand how financial 
knowledge interacts with those decisions and if the financially literate are making more 
informed choices.  
Passivity, or inertia, is a behavioral pattern that figures prominently among those 
displayed by pension holders and is a likely explanation for the lack of diversification and 
rebalancing over time. Prior analyses of panel data collected from individual investors 
indicate that large majorities of pension holders make little or no change to their portfolios 
over time (Ameriks and Zeldas 2004; Calvet, Campbell and Sodini 2009; Brunnermeier and 
Nagel 2008; Yamaguichi, Mitchell, Mottola, and Utkus 2007; Agnew, Balduzzi and Suden 
2003). Researchers explain that this is the result of individuals’ tendency towards 
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procrastination, the ―path of least resistance‖ and an absence of well-defined preferences 
with respect to their pension management responsibilities (Choi, Laibson, Madrian and 
Metrick 2002; Madrian and Shea 2001; Thaler and Benartzi 2004; Benartzi and Thaler 2007). 
These behavioral responses or adaptations to the administration of their assets within their 
pension portfolios suggests that many, if not most, fail to realign and rebalance the equity 
share within their pension portfolios with their investment horizon over time.  
Inertia within Defined Contribution plans and Financial Literacy 
One might expect that the financially literate would recognize the importance of 
periodically changing the asset distribution within their pension portfolio as well as have the 
confidence to do so. In other words, the costs associated with financial decision-making are 
presumed to be lower for those individuals that are more financially literate. This could 
explain the inertia evident among those with defined contribution plans. As Yamaguichi, 
Mitchell, Mottola, and Utkus (2007) state, it is ―important to determine whether this inertia is 
driven by financial illiteracy.‖   
Hypothesis 3: Those that are less financially literate will be less 
likely to have ever changed the asset allocation within their 
defined contribution plan.  
Data and Variables 
Data 
This analysis will rely on data collected in the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), a 
nationally representative survey of U.S. residents born in 1953 or earlier. Data collection for 
this panel dataset began in 1992 and has been augmented since then with additional cohorts 
of the aged from the 48 contiguous states. The longitudinal survey design of the HRS allows 
  
113 
 
researchers to follow older cohorts as they make the transition from work into retirement. 
Every two years the HRS compiles information on the demographics, health, social, and 
economic factors from the more than 20,000 elderly individuals it follows. The survey 
provides detailed financial data including pension information as well as information on the 
timing of Social Security claiming decisions. Each wave of the HRS also contains an 
experimental module that is administered to a random subsample of the respondents covering 
a variety of different aging related material. Included in the experimental module of the 2008 
wave was a battery of questions aimed at measuring the extent to which the respondent 
understood financial and investment related concepts.  
Sample  
The financial literacy questions in the experimental module were administered to a 
random subsample of 1,474 respondents in the 2008 wave. Those respondents that 
participated in the experimental survey were then randomly assigned to two separate groups 
at the beginning of the survey. For the purposes of this analysis these groups will be referred 
to as Group A and Group B. Respondents in each group were asked the same questions, 
however, the question wording throughout the financial and investment-related questions 
were different for each group. For example, Group A was asked whether the following 
statement that was true or false: if the interest rate falls, bond prices will rise. Alternatively, 
Group B was asked to make the same determination using the following statement: if the 
interest rate falls, bond prices will fall.  
Responses to questions from this wave will be used to construct the variables the 
defined financial literacy index in this analysis. The outcomes and control variables will be 
constructed from data provided by respondents in the other sections of the core survey.  
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The data from 1,474 respondents are used in this study. However, the sample size 
varies depending on the outcome and dependent variable measures employed in each of the 
separate regressions. The variation in the sample sizes is largely due to the restrictions that 
the outcome variables place on the individuals that eligible to be included in the analysis. For 
example, one outcome looks at the timing of an individual’s claiming decision for Social 
Security. Therefore, only those individuals that have actually claimed their Social Security 
benefits are included in the regression model for this outcome. The additional restrictions that 
each outcome requires for the individual to be included in the estimation sample are detailed 
below along with the outcome specific sample sizes.     
Dependent Variables  
Timing of Claiming Decision (DFRA) 
 The outcome variable in this analysis, DFRA, measures the difference in months 
between when an individual reaches their Full Retirement Age (FRA) and when they decide 
to claim their Social Security benefits. To construct this variable, individuals were first 
assigned their respective FRA as measured in months. The FRA for an individual born in 
1945 is age 66 so each person born in this year was assigned a value of 792 to represent their 
FRA as expressed terms of the number of months they would have to live to obtain their full 
Social Security benefit (66 years x 12 months = 792 months). Then the actual age in which 
the individual claimed their benefits (also expressed in terms of months) was subtracted from 
their FRA to obtain the difference, if any, in the number of months that an individual claimed 
their benefits before or after their FRA. If the same individual born in 1945 in the previous 
example were to claim his Social Security benefit 3 months after turning 63, then he would 
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have claimed his benefit after living 759 months, 33 months before he was eligible for his 
full benefit and would be assigned a value of -33 (752 - 792 = -33).  
This dependent variable narrows the estimation sample included in this portion of the 
study because the measure is only observed for those individuals that are currently receiving 
Social Security. The operationalization of this variable would not capture those individuals 
that were currently eligible for benefits but not yet receiving them. This might bias the 
estimate of the coefficient on the financial literacy variable downward if these individuals are 
also more financially literate. There were 71 individuals that were eligible for Social Security 
but had not yet claimed their benefits. Finally, the sample was further restricted to those 
individuals that had applied for Social Security benefits after the minimum eligible age of 62. 
This step was taken to ensure that the sample did not include those individuals that applied 
for benefits due to a disability. The inclusion of these individuals may have otherwise 
resulted in an upwardly biased estimate on the coefficient for financial literacy because those 
that reported ever receiving disability have lower financial literacy scores than those who had 
not. After the restrictions were applied, this outcome was observed for 464 individuals.  
The summary statistics for this measure are provided in Table 4. These estimates 
indicate that most individuals claim their benefits prior to their FRA. On average, individuals 
claim their Social Security benefits 22.6 months prior to their FRA. 
Distance Between Recommended and Actual Asset Mix (DIST) 
The second dependent variable is a continuous measure of the difference between the 
recommended and actual distribution of a household’s financial assets between stocks and 
other, less risky, investment vehicles (Treasury bills, bonds, savings accounts, and money 
market funds). For simplicity, the non-stock investments will be referred to collectively as 
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―bonds.‖ To estimate this difference, the age of the respondent is first subtracted from 100 
(or the average age of the respondent and spouse if the respondent is married) to arrive at the 
recommended level of stock market exposure (RAM). The RAM is then subtracted from the 
actual share of respondent’s portfolio invested in stocks (AAM). Finally, the absolute value 
of this difference is taken to create a non-negative measure that approximates how close or 
how far an individual’s portfolio is from their recommended asset mix given their age 
(DIST).  
             
                 
This DIST variable has higher values for those individuals with portfolios that are 
further away from their recommended asset mix, increasing by one for each percentage point 
above or below the recommend amount with 0 representing a ―balanced‖ portfolio. The 
absolute value of the difference is taken because equal weight is given to portfolios that are 
too conservative and too risky. For example, an individual aged 65 with 90 percent of his 
financial assets in stocks rather than bonds would have a value of 55 (100 - 65 = 35 and |90 - 
35| = 55). If this same individual were instead to have 90 percent of their portfolio invested in 
bonds and 10 percent in stocks then he would have a value of 25 for this measure (100 - 65 = 
35 and |10 – 35| = 25). This measure is used in an ordinary least squares regression model.  
While the construction of this measure is based on the ―100 – Age = Stock Share‖ 
rule-of-thumb, this study does not mean to imply that this is the only correct distribution 
(Ameriks and Zeldas 2004; Agnew, Balduzzi, and Sunden 2003).
28
 Portfolio distributions are 
a function of a number of different determinants that one can attempt to control for including 
                                                 
28
 This advice can be found on many popular financial media outlets such as the popular, Get Rich Slowly blog, 
but without attribution. For example: http://www.getrichslowly.org/blog/2009/03/09/25-favorite-financial-rules-
of-thumb/.   
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life expectancy, risk aversion, and investment horizons as well as other less quantifiable 
factors that affect this decision. This measure is intended to be a useful, albeit imperfect, 
heuristic for analyzing the time component of portfolio risk as it relates to age and 
diversification across asset classes. It will be used to determine whether or the extent to 
which the more financially literate are more likely to have distributions that more closely 
resemble their recommended allocations.  
The mean value from Table 4 indicates that, on average, individuals are 41 
percentage points away from the recommended asset mix in their portfolios. This outcome 
was observed for only those individuals with financial assets, 577 individuals   
Portfolio Inertia 
The third variable is intended to capture portfolio inertia over time.
29
 It was 
constructed from the HRS survey question that asked respondents whether they had ever 
changed the asset allocation within their defined contribution plan. Responses to this 
question were used to create a dichotomous measure that is coded 1 for those individuals that 
reported having ever changed their allocations and 0 for those that had said they had never 
done so. The buying or selling of stocks, bonds or any funds outside of any defined 
contribution pension plan including anything held within an IRA or Keogh account, would 
not be captured by this measure. This measure was observed for the subsample of individuals 
that reported to having a defined contribution plan in the 2004 or 2006 wave of the HRS, a 
total of 256 respondents.
30
   
                                                 
29
 While only one wave of data are used. The question in this wave asks the respondent has ever changed their 
pension allocation, which captures activity in the past, over the life of the pension.  
30
 The question asked those with defined contribution plans whether they had ever changed the allocation of 
assets within their plan. It was asked only in the 2004 and 2006 wave of the HRS. 
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This measure is essentially a proxy for how engaged an individual is in the 
investment decisions related to their defined contribution pension, but it does not evaluate the 
extent to which these decisions are in the best interest of the individual (e.g. making it more 
diversified across time, across asset classes, or within a particular asset class). Despite this 
limitation, the portfolio inertia variable will be useful in determining whether pension 
activity is associated with financial literacy. That so many individuals fail to ever change the 
allocations within their plan raises important questions regarding their ability to administer 
these plans on their own behalf. It is important to determine whether financial literacy may 
play a positive role in helping engage individuals in these decisions. 
The mean value from Table 4 indicates that only 50 percent of those with a defined 
contribution plan have ever changed the allocation within their plan.   
Independent Variables   
Financial Literacy. The key explanatory variable is an index aimed at measuring 
financial literacy. This index is constructed from responses to financial and investment 
related questions within the experimental module of the 2008 wave of the HRS. Only those 
survey questions in which an objectively correct or incorrect response can be given are used 
to construct this index, excluding those aimed as measuring the respondent’s attitudes 
regarding financial matters. The questions used to construct this index are common among 
those studies attempting to measure financial literacy (Lusardi and Mitchell 2009; Lusardi 
and Mitchell 2007).  Scores on the financial literacy index are based on the number of correct 
responses to the following seven financial and investment-related questions: 
1. Few versus Many 
a. Group A: You should invest most of your money in a few good stocks that 
you select rather than in lots of stocks or in mutual funds. [T or F] 
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b. Group B: You should invest in either mutual funds or a large number of 
different stocks instead of just a few stocks. [T or F] 
2. Risk and Diversification 
a. Group A: When an investor spreads money between 20 stocks, rather than 
2, the risk of losing a lot of money decreases. [T or F] 
b. Group B: When an investor spreads money between 20 stocks, rather than 
2, the risk of losing a lot of money decreases. [T or F] 
3. International Stocks  
a. Group A: It is best to avoid owning stocks of foreign companies. [T or F] 
b. Group B: It is a good idea to own stocks of foreign companies. [T or F] 
4. Company Stock 
a. Group A: An employee of a company with publicly traded stock should 
have a lot of his or her retirement savings in the company's stock. [T or F] 
b. Group B: An employee of a company with publicly traded stock should 
have little or none of his or her retirement savings in the company's stock. 
[T or F] 
5. Bonds and Interest Rates 
a. Group A: If the interest rate falls, bond prices will rise. [T or F] 
b. Group B: If the interest rate falls, bond prices will fall. [T or F] 
6. Interest Rates 
a. Group A: If you start out with $1,000 and earn an average return of 10% 
per year for 30 years, after compounding, the initial $1,000 will have 
grown to more than  $6,000. [T or F] 
b. Group B: If you start out with $1,000 and earn an average return of 10% 
per year for 30 years, after compounding, the initial $1,000 will have 
grown to less than $6,000. [T or F] 
7. Credit Card 
a. Using money in a bank savings account to pay off credit card debt is 
usually a good idea. [T or F] 
b. Using money in a bank savings account to pay off credit card debt is 
usually a bad idea. [T or F] 
 
The maximum possible score is 7 (indicating 7 correct responses) and the lowest 
possible score is 0 (indicating no correct responses). The mean score for the index was 3.2 
indicating that, on average, the sample was able to provide a correct response to less than half 
of the questions. Other studies have also used an additive index, such as this, to 
operationalize financial literacy in their models (Brown, Kapteyn, and Mitchell 2011). The 
measure of internal consistency for this index (Cronbach’s alpha) was .52; lower than the 
conventional standard of .70. Multiple iterations of the index were tried to increase the 
  
120 
 
internal consistency of this index, but each resulted in lower measures. For an overview of 
why the Cronbach’s alpha measure is lower than the conventional standard of internal 
consistency see the discussion of measurement error in the Appendix.  
Control Variables  
Controls Common to Each Model. This analysis relies on a common set of 
demographic control variables used in the models for each outcome. These variables are 
listed in Table 4 and include a continuous measure of the respondents’ age and dichotomous 
measures indicating the respondent’s sex, race, marital status and educational attainment. 
Each model also includes a dummy variable coded 1 if the respondent reported being in 
excellent/very good/good or 0 if in poor/very poor health. A dummy variable indicating the 
respondents’ financial planning horizon is coded 1 for those individuals reporting to that their 
planning horizon is longer than 10 years, 5-10 years, or the next few years and 0 for those 
reporting planning horizons that only include the next few months or to next year. The 
models also include a measure of the respondent’s self-reported life expectancy. Those 
respondents that were younger than 75 when the HRS survey began were asked about their 
probability (0 -100) of living until age 75 and this continuous measure was included in the 
model to control for the effect of subjective life expectancy on, say, the timing of one’s 
claiming decision.
31
 The logged value of the estimate of the present value of a households 
                                                 
31
 In the HRS, respondents are asked to provide their projections for their life expectancy in terms of the 
likelihood that they would survive to 75. It is important to control for an individual’s subjective expectations for 
life expectancy, using, preferably, those expectations just before they, say, claimed their Social Security 
benefits. Where possible, these measures were replaced with the values from the wave prior to the individuals 
claiming decision for the regression analyzing the timing of the individual’s Social Security decision. More 
details are provided on these adjustments in the following section. This is an important adjustment because, if 
people are incorporating their life expectancy into their claiming decision, it is important to know what their 
subjective expectations were when they could first make their decision rather than measure the affect of, say, 
current health status. The most recent measures provide no sense of the circumstances faced by the individual at 
the time of their claiming decision; therefore, many of the measures were adjusted for this portion of the 
analysis to reflect the measure of the variable just before they claimed their benefits. Where this was not 
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defined benefit  at age 65 is also included to control for the possibility that this type of wealth 
would influence claiming and investment decisions.
32
 Finally, log-transformed measures of 
household income and wealth were included in the models.  
 Regression Specific Controls. Each model includes control variables specific to the 
outcomes analyzed in each model. The model analyzing the relationship between financial 
literacy and the timing of the individuals’ claiming decision includes a dummy variable 
indicating whether the individual has a health condition that limits their ability to work. 
Presumably, those with work-limiting health conditions may be compelled to claim their 
benefits prior to their FRA out of necessity and it was important to control for this 
possibility. This variable is composed of responses from the most recent wave prior to the 
respondent’s decision to claim their benefits.33 A dummy variable indicating whether the 
respondent has worked in any year since receiving Social Security is included to control for 
the possibility that those that want or need to work in retirement are distinct from those that 
do not. The income variable in this model was reconfigured to represent the income of the 
household prior to claiming decision as was the total household wealth measure. Finally, the 
number of children that the respondent reports having was included to stand as a proxy for 
the ability of the respondent to rely on family in retirement.     
                                                                                                                                                       
available, data were used from the wave closest to that decision to try to capture their life expectancy at the 
closest point around their claiming decision. The following section provides more information on which 
variables were affected by these adjustments.  
32
 The data from this measure came from the 1992, 1998 and 2004 waves of the HRS. An attempt was made to 
procure the Social Security data from the HRS but a lack of a secure computer to house this information 
precluded my eligibility to obtain this data.  
33
 Again, this step was taken because an individual’s current condition may not reflect their condition prior to 
their claiming decision and this measure is intended to control for the effect of a work limiting condition on the 
timing of an individual’s claiming decision. For example, a 70 year-old respondent may have a work limiting 
condition in 2008, but did not suffer from that condition prior to their claiming decision in which case, this 
condition would not have affected their decision to claim early. 
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In addition to the set of common control variables, the second and third models 
analyzing the age-adjusted distribution of investments by asset classes includes dummy 
variables that are intended to measure risk aversion. The risk aversion measure is constructed 
from question in the HRS that presents respondents with a hypothetical choice between a 
current job and a new one that has varying likelihoods of either increasing or reducing the 
level of income they receive from their current job.
34
 There are three risk aversion dummy 
variables included in the model. Those that opted to take the second, more risky, job situation 
at each stage of the question were coded 1 for the dummy variable indicating the least risk 
averse; those that took the second job in the first stage of the scenario and the first job in the 
second were coded 1 for the dummy variable indicating that they were third most risk averse; 
those that took the fist job in the first stage of the scenario and the second job in the second 
were coded 1 for the dummy variable indicating that they were second most risk averse; 
those that took the first job at each stage of the question were coded 1 for the dummy 
variable indicating the most risk averse. The risk aversion variable is intended to control for 
the fact that individuals may have a more robust appetite for risk and therefore desire to carry 
more stocks in their portfolio regardless of their age, or conversely those with more risk 
aversion would hold more bonds. A second control is included that measures the likelihood 
that the respondent will leave an inheritance of $10,000 or more. To control for the 
possibility that the knowledge that one intends to leave an inheritance would result in an 
                                                 
34
 The question is a series of unfolding questions. Whether or not the individual proceeds to next portion of the 
question depends on their responses. For the full sequence, see the Appendix. The first stage of risk aversion 
measure is derived from the following question: ―Suppose that you are the only income earner in the family. 
Your doctor recommends that you move because of allergies, and you have to choose between two possible 
jobs. The first would guarantee your current total family income for life. The second is possibly better paying, 
but the income is also less certain. There is a 50-50 chance the second job would double your total lifetime 
income and a 50-50 chance that it would cut it by a third. Which job would you take -- the first job or the 
second job?‖  
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outward adjust in the individual’s investment horizon. A longer investment horizon would 
call for an increase in the share of stocks in their portfolio. 
There are no control variables specific to analysis of portfolio inertia. Consideration 
was given to the inclusion of a variable measuring the mix of stocks versus bonds within the 
individual portfolio. However, the direction of causality in this relationship is not clear and 
likely endogenous. While it is possible that the asset mix can predict pension activity, the 
findings from Ameriks and Zeldas (2004) indicate that relationship likely runs in the other 
direction. They find that passivity results in a higher concentration in the asset that has 
gained the most in relative value which indicates that portfolio inertia can actually determine 
the asset mix within the portfolio rather than the other way around.  
Methods 
 This analysis will attempt to measure the association between financial literacy and 
each of the outcomes identified using multiple regression techniques. Ordinary least squares 
regression is used to analyze the Social Security claiming (DFRA) and optimal asset mix 
(DIST) outcomes and logistic regression is used to analyze the variable indicating portfolio 
inertia.
35
 Two models are estimated for portfolio inertia; one that includes wealth in defined 
                                                 
35
 The timing of the claiming decision was also modeled using a Cox proportional hazards model to analyze the 
timing of the claiming decision after individuals became eligible for benefits at age 62.  Cox regression is an 
event history analysis technique that is used to estimate the hazard rate which, in this analysis, is defined as the 
conditional probability that an individual will claim their Social Security benefits at time t given that he/she has 
not already applied for his/her benefits. The initial time period (    ) for each individual in the sample is 
defined as the month that they became eligible for Social Security, the month of their 62
nd
 birthday. Individuals 
remain in the sample until they have claimed their benefits in time period   . Because the claiming decision is 
not observed for those individuals that had not yet claimed their benefits, the data were right censored. There is 
nothing that can be done about right censoring except collect at later time periods. Due to the survey design of 
the HRS and the lack of detailed information on exact timing of specific changes in the factors that likely effect 
claiming behavior the variables in the model were time invariant. This analysis controlled for the same 
covariates as the analysis of the DFA outcome. Here again, financial literacy was not found to be associated 
with the timing of the claiming decision. However, this analysis could be expanded to incorporate some of the 
health shocks that may affect the timing of a claiming decision such as the month and year that an individual 
experienced a heart attack. This is an analysis to be replicated in a subsequent study but will not likely focus on 
financial literacy.  
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contribution plans and another substitutes this measure for total household wealth minus 
defined contribution plan wealth. It is possible that the amount of wealth in a defined 
contribution plan will determine whether an individual will take the time to manage those 
assets—individuals may not bother managing low account balances. However, it is also 
possible that defined contribution wealth is determined by the activity of the individual. To 
account for possible simultaneity between inertia and defined contribution wealth, two 
specifications were necessary; one that assumes it does not amount and another that assumes 
it does.    
It is important to note that the aim of this study is not to measure the causal effect of 
financial literacy on the outcomes analyzed. While a causal analysis would be preferable, the 
observational data from this module does not lend itself to quasi-experimental techniques. 
However, there is value in establishing whether optimal financial behaviors are correlated 
with financial literacy. The findings from basic regression analyses can serve as the basis for 
future causal studies by focusing the attention of researchers on those outcomes thought to be 
affected by financial literacy. Though, for this study, the lack of a causal framework requires 
that any significant relationships between financial literacy and the outcome variables be 
interpreted carefully and with the acknowledgment that at least some of the measured effect 
is likely confounded by unobserved heterogeneity in the data.  
Results   
  The results from the regression models for each outcome are reported in Table 5. 
Model 1 estimates the relationship between financial literacy and the timing of individual 
claiming decisions. The coefficient (.37) on the literacy index variable indicates that the 
correlation between financial literacy and the timing of individual Social Security claiming 
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decisions is not significantly different from zero. That is, financial literacy, as defined in this 
analysis, does not appear to be an important determinant for whether an individual’s delay in 
claiming their Social Security benefits beyond 62, the minimum age of eligibility.  
The significant results generally move in the expected direction. College graduates 
appear to delay their claiming decision by 4 months on average.
36
 A one percent change in 
income at age 62 is associated with a delay of 2 months in the claiming decision implying 
that those with high incomes are less likely claim their benefits. Those that work while 
receiving their Social Security benefits also delayed their claiming decision by almost 6.5 
months after having turned age 62. The positive coefficient suggests that this may be 
capturing the variation associated with whether the individual places an intrinsic value on 
work. Those with higher levels of defined contribution wealth are also more likely to delay 
their claiming decision. Older individuals also appear more likely to delay their claiming 
decisions but the age variable is likely capturing the generational differences in claiming 
behavior. The finding that older individuals appear to have delayed their claiming decision is 
consistent with the data indicating that younger retirees are claiming their benefits earlier 
than previous generations (Figure 2). Finally, having a work limiting condition at age 62 
appears to result in those individuals claiming Social Security 6 months earlier as does 
having more children, on average.  
 The results from Model 2 estimating the relationship between financial literacy and 
the risky financial asset allocation within household portfolios are displayed in the second 
column of Table 5. According to the coefficient of the financial literacy variable, the 
relationship between these two variables moves in the expected direction but is modest in 
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 The correlation coefficient for having a college education and the financial literacy index is .26, indicating 
that college educated individuals are more likely to be financially literate.  
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size and significant only at the .10 level. A unit increase in the financial literacy index is 
associated with a 1 percentage point decrease in the difference between the recommended 
share of the individual’s asset allocated between stocks and bonds given their age and their 
actual distribution. This result suggests that the financially literacy is only weakly associated 
with having a portfolio that is in proportion to the assumed investment horizon of the 
household. The coefficient on the financial literacy variable is small and the statistical 
significance of this relationship is below conventional standards. In other words, the 
financially literate are more diversified across the time component of investment risk, but not 
by much.  
With regard to the other explanatory variables, it is encouraging that the group of 
least risk averse individuals tend to hold a portfolio with a more risky asset allocation given 
their age. This finding lends support to the claim that the outcome variable in this portion of 
the analysis is a valid measure of investment risk. However, the financial literacy index and 
the risk-aversion measure were the only variables that are significantly associated with the 
outcome. This result may be due to an under-specified model or it may be that investment 
decisions are inherently noisy and therefore difficult to model.   
The third and fourth columns of Table 5 display the results from the logistic 
regression of the outcome indicating whether an individual has ever changed the asset 
allocation of their defined contribution plan on the financial literary index and a vector of 
control variables. The coefficient on the financial literacy index in each model indicates that 
there is a positive and significant correlation between financial literacy and the likelihood 
that an individual has ever changed the asset allocation within their defined contribution plan. 
The strength of this relationship, however, depends on the specification of the model.  
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The two different models are distinguished by the differences in the wealth variable 
included in each. The model 3a (column 3) has the log of the wealth within the defined 
contribution plan and model 3b (column 4) has the log of total wealth. Due to the nature of 
logistic regression and how unobserved heterogeneity affects the estimates in this type of 
estimation, it is not possible to compare the coefficients or their statistical significance across 
the models so each regression model is discussed separately (Hoetker 2007; Mood 2010; 
Allison 1999). In column 3, higher levels of income, defined contribution wealth, and 
defined benefit all increase the likelihood that an individual takes an active role in managing 
their pension. These results allow for two possible interpretations: 1) those with low levels of 
wealth within their defined contribution plan may not feel compelled to take the time to 
manage the assets and/or 2) because the wealthy have more assets, they are more comfortable 
in involving themselves in the decisions that affect them. Being married and having a higher 
subjective life expectancy each decrease this likelihood. The explanation for this relationship 
is not entirely clear. In column 4, again, higher levels of defined benefit wealth and total 
wealth (minus defined benefit wealth) are associated with an increase in the likelihood that 
an individual has ever taken an active role in managing their account by changing the 
allocation within their pension plan. Finally, the number of children a person has and their 
higher subjective life expectancy are each associated with a lower likelihood of actively 
managing any defined contribution pension balance.  
Discussion 
The results from this analysis indicate that financial literacy is not associated with 
Social Security claiming behavior and provides evidence that it is weakly associated with 
recommended investment behaviors. The only factors that appear to predict the timing of 
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individuals’ claiming decisions suggest that those most likely to enter retirement with the 
least financial security—the unemployed, those without a college degree, and low wealth 
households—are the most likely to experience a reduction in their Social Security benefit due 
to claiming their benefits early. No direct measure of Social Security knowledge was 
included in the construction of the index used in this analysis and it is possible that are more 
knowledgeable regarding their benefits may make more informed decisions related to Social 
Security, but this possibility cannot be established from this analysis. The results suggest that 
improving financial literacy in one or two areas (investment and estimation) may not have 
spillover effects for individuals’ behavior in other financially-related areas that impact the 
welfare of individuals and households such as the Social Security. Future research may focus 
on how direct knowledge of the Social Security rules defining benefit levels, and perhaps 
how such rules are framed, affects the claiming behavior of program participants.  
Although the strength of the statistical relationships are weaker than conventional 
levels of significance and the size strength of this association appears weak, the financially 
literate appear to hold portfolios that are more ―balanced‖ according to their age, or time 
diversified, and are more active in managing their account balances. The findings do not 
provide overwhelming empirical support for the idea that financial literacy will significantly 
reduce investor risk associated with asset rebalancing over time.  
One encouraging finding is that the financially literate appear to be more engaged 
with their retirement assets by taking an active role in changing the account balances. 
However, as far as financial management goes, this is little more than the bare minimum. It is 
not clear that this knowledge leads to substantial reductions in financial risk or better 
management, just that it is associated with more activity.  
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Until we know more about whether the financially literate are more capable 
administrators of their wealth, the short-term solution with respect to this issue may be 
advocating for default mutual funds or exchange-traded funds that automatically adjust 
equity and bond exposure based on the age of the investor. The Social Security issue may 
prove more intractable because increasing knowledge and awareness may be the one of only 
a handful of possible solutions. Although the sample size in this study was, admittedly, small 
and the measure for internal consistency of the index fairly weak, financial literacy does not 
appear to affect this decision. Future research should be aimed at obtaining more reliable data 
from a large sample and establishing a causal link between financial literacy and financial 
behaviors. 
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     Tables and Figures 
Figure 1: 
 
Source: Social Security Administration (2008). ―When to Start Receiving    
Retirement Benefits.‖ 
 
             Figure 2: 
 
Source: National Center for Health Statistics (2011). ―Health, United 
States, 2010.‖ Social Security Administration (2011). ―Annual Statistical 
Supplement to the Social Security Bulletin, 2010.‖ 
 
 
$0
$200
$400
$600
$800
$1,000
$1,200
$1,400
62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70
Monthly Benefit Amounts Differ Based on the Age You 
Decide to Start Receiving Benefits   
0
5
10
15
20
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
1960 1965 1970 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2009
Y
ea
rs
 
P
er
ce
n
t 
Year 
Percent Claiming Social Security Benefits Early and 
Life Expectancy at Age 65 
Percent Life Expectancy
  
 
 
1
3
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Social Security Eligibility: Ages for Full Retirement Benefits, Penalties, and Credits  
Year of Birth 
Year Individual 
Turns 62 
Full Retirement 
Age (FRA) 
Per Month Reduction If Benefits 
Began Prior to Full Retirement Age  
Age 62 Benefits 
as % of FRA 
Benefits 
Per Year Delayed 
Retirement 
Credits  
Age 70 Benefits 
as a % of FRA 
Benefits 
1936 or prior 1998 or prior 65 5/9% 80% 6% 130% 
1937 1999 65 5/9% 80% 6 1/2% 132 1/2% 
1938 2000 65 and 2 months 5/9% for 36 months + 5/12%/mo** 79 1/6% 6 1/2% 131 5/12% 
1939 2001 65 and 4 months 5/9% for 36 months + 5/12%/mo** 78 1/3% 7% 132 2/3% 
1940 2002 65 and 6 months 5/9% for 36 months + 5/12%/mo** 77 1/2% 7% 131 1/2% 
1941 2003 65 and 8 months 5/9% for 36 months + 5/12%/mo** 76 2/3% 7 1/2% 132 1/2% 
1942 2004 65 and 10 months 5/9% for 36 months + 5/12%/mo** 75 5/6% 7 1/2% 131 1/2% 
1943-1954 2005-2016 66 5/9% for 36 months + 5/12%/mo** 75% 8% 132% 
1955 2017 66 and 2 months 5/9% for 36 months + 5/12%/mo** 74 1/6% 8% 130 2/3% 
1956 2018 66 and 4 months 5/9% for 36 months + 5/12%/mo** 73 1/3% 8% 129 1/3% 
1957 2019 66 and 6 months 5/9% for 36 months + 5/12%/mo** 72 1/2% 8% 128% 
1958 2020 66 and 8 months 5/9% for 36 months + 5/12%/mo** 71 2/3% 8% 126 2/3% 
1959 2021 66 and 10 months 5/9% for 36 months + 5/12%/mo** 70 5/6% 8% 125 1/3% 
1960 or later 2022 or later 67 5/9% for 36 months + 5/12%/mo** 70% 8% 124% 
Source: Meyer and Reichenstein (2010) and Jennings and Reichenstein (2001). The table and all the data come from Meyer and Reichenstein (2010). 
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Table 2: Monthly Payoffs from Social Security for a Single Person with Full Retirement Age (FRA) 
of 66 and Life Expectancy of 22 Years After Reaching Age 62 
Age Years 
Claim Social 
Security at age 62 
Claim Social 
Security at age 66 
Claim Social 
Security at age 70 
62 1 $1,500     
63 2 $1,500     
64 3 $1,500     
65 4 $1,500     
66 5 $1,500 $2,000   
67 6 $1,500 $2,000   
68 7 $1,500 $2,000   
69 8 $1,500 $2,000   
70 9 $1,500 $2,000 $2,640 
71 10 $1,500 $2,000 $2,640 
… … … … … 
83 22 $1,500 $2,000 $2,640 
Present Value of Social Security    $308,044 $319,094 $311,311 
Source: Meyer and Reichenstein (2010) 
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Table 3: Monthly Payoffs from Social Security for a Single Person with Full Retirement Age (FRA) 
of 66 and Life Expectancy of 10 Years After Reaching Age 62 
Age Years 
Claim Social 
Security at age 62 
Claim Social 
Security at age 66 
Claim Social 
Security at age 70 
62 1 $1,500     
63 2 $1,500     
64 3 $1,500     
65 4 $1,500     
66 5 $1,500 $2,000   
67 6 $1,500 $2,000   
68 7 $1,500 $2,000   
69 8 $1,500 $2,000   
70 9 $1,500 $2,000 $2,640 
71 10 $1,500 $2,000 $2,640 
Dies 72         
Present Value of Social Security  $267,294  $121,978  $51,118  
Source: Meyer and Reichenstein (2010) 
 
 
 
  
134 
 
  Table 4: Variable Means 
  Mean/Percentage 
Average Number of Months between Claiming Decision and FRA -22.6 
Distance Between Recommended and Actual Asset Mix 41 
Ever Changed their Pension Allocation 0.5 
Financial Literacy Index 4.1 
College 0.26 
Male 0.45 
Black 0.11 
Married 0.77 
Reports Being in Good Health 0.9 
Age 66 
Number of Children 3.2 
Respondent Reports Being a Long-term Financial Planner  0.76 
Currently Employed 0.47 
Total Household Wealth (Median) 303650 
Total DC Wealth (Median) 40000 
Total Present Value of DB Wealth (Median) 159705 
Total Household Income (Median) 55800 
Least Risk Averse 0.13 
3rd Most Risk Averse 0.11 
2nd Most Risk Averse  0.16 
Most Risk Averse 0.6 
Probability of Leaving a Bequest of $10K or More 0.79 
Probability of Surviving the 10 years 0.55 
Work Limiting Health Condition 0.23 
Number of Observations 808 
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Table 5: Regression Results 
  
Timing of Soc 
Sec Claim Dec. 
Age-Adj. 
Pen. Alloc. 
Ev Chng 
Pen. Alloc 
Ev Chng Pen. 
Alloc 
Financial Literacy Index -0.365 -1.062* 0.317* 0.277*** 
  (0.539) (0.606) (0.188) (0.098) 
Ln(Income)   -0.965 1.645*** -0.150 
    (0.919) (0.614) (0.121) 
Ln(Income at 62) 1.949***       
  (0.705)       
College 4.121* 1.379 0.722 0.404 
  (2.280) (2.077) (0.637) (0.340) 
Black 0.900 -0.624 0.016 -0.187 
  (1.774) (1.927) (0.594) (0.315) 
Married 0.622 -0.117 -3.026** -0.635 
  (2.873) (3.637) (1.322) (0.497) 
In Good Health -3.074 0.076 -1.135 0.141 
  (2.132) (2.601) (0.988) (0.413) 
Age -4.589 -1.771 0.575 -0.440 
  (3.191) (3.574) (0.915) (0.475) 
Age Squared 18.554** -0.863 0.980 0.772** 
  (7.591) (1.626) (0.704) (0.362) 
Number of Children -0.122** 0.011 -0.008 -0.006** 
  (0.054) (0.013) (0.006) (0.003) 
Male 0.469 -0.559 0.087 -0.035 
  (0.390) (0.523) (0.148) (0.090) 
Long-term Finan. Planner  1.311 0.199 0.035 0.184 
  (1.893) (2.358) (0.811) (0.380) 
Log(DB Wealth) 0.251 0.069 0.095* 0.077*** 
  (0.157) (0.158) (0.049) (0.025) 
Currently Working   2.418 2.052 0.116 
    (2.144) (1.538) (0.459) 
Ln(Total Wealth)   0.174   0.295** 
    (0.891)   (0.125) 
Pr(Surviving Next 10 Yrs)   0.024 -0.026** -0.011* 
    (0.033) (0.012) (0.005) 
Least Risk Averse   6.177** -1.453 0.450 
    (2.933) (1.086) (0.566) 
3rd Most Risk Averse   -1.264 2.409* 0.110 
    (2.821) (1.405) (0.499) 
2nd Most Risk Averse    -0.077 0.512 -0.039 
    (2.502) (0.613) (0.358) 
Pr(Leave Bequest >10K)   -0.014 0.003 0.006 
    (0.037) (0.010) (0.005) 
Log(Total DC Wealth) 1.949***   0.306**   
  (0.705)   (0.131)   
Pr(Surviving to 75) -0.032       
  (0.031)       
Work Lim. Hlth Cond. -6.105**       
  (2.804)       
Ever Worked in Retirement 6.544***       
  (1.711)       
Log(Wealth at 62) 0.190       
  (0.560)       
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Constant -743.469*** 62.276 -54.286** -26.168** 
  (267.866) (52.441) (23.104) (11.061) 
Observations 464 577 126 256 
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Appendix 
 
Measurement Error and Cronbach’s Alpha 
Cronbach’s Alpha is a measure of internal consistency that indicates how closely a 
group of items are related. This measure is used to provide evidence that multiple items in an 
index are measuring the same construct and is often referred to as the reliability coefficient. 
In this analysis, this measure is used to measure how well the components of the financial 
literacy index measure financial literacy. A reliability coefficient of .70 or higher is 
considered standard in social science research. The reliability coefficient in this study is 
lower than conventional standards and this is likely to due to measurement error in the data 
related to the financial literacy questions in the HRS.  
Those respondents that participated in the experimental survey were randomly 
assigned to two separate groups at the beginning of the survey. For the purposes of this 
analysis these groups will be referred to as Group A and Group B. Respondents in each 
group were asked the same questions, however, the question wording throughout the 
financial and investment-related questions were different for each group. For example, Group 
A was asked whether the statement that was true or false: if the interest rate falls, bond prices 
will rise. Alternatively, Group B was asked to make the same determination using the 
following statement: if the interest rate falls, bond prices will fall. While alternative wording 
of the questions were intended to determine the respondents’ knowledge of the same concept, 
the rate of correct responses frequently depended on how the financial literacy questions 
were worded in this module (Lusardi, Mitchell, and Curto 2009) These differences represent 
the extent of measurement error in responses provided that could be the result of either 
respondents not understanding the question or, more likely, in the form of guessing. 
Measurement error resulting from responses sensitive to question wording is not specific to 
the HRS but is commonly thought to exist among surveys measuring financial literacy 
(Lusardi and Mitchell 2007; Lusardi and Mitchell 2009; van Rooij, Lusardi and Alessie 
2007). The measurement error in these responses would lower the reliability coefficient for 
the financial literacy index. 
Risk Aversion 
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Suppose that you are the only income earner in the family. Your doctor recommends that 
you move because of allergies, and you have to choose between two possible jobs. The first 
would guarantee your current total family income for life. The second is possibly better 
paying, but the income is also less certain. There is a 50-50 chance the second job would 
double your total lifetime income and a 50-50 chance that it would cut it by a third. Which 
job would you take -- the first job or the second job? 
If first job is chosen in the first question, then: Suppose the chances were 50-50 that the 
second job would double your lifetime income and 50-50 that it would cut it by twenty 
percent. Would you take the first job or the second job? 
If first job is chosen in the second question again, then: Suppose the chances were 50-50 
that the second job would double your lifetime income and 50-50 that it would cut it by 10 
percent. Would you take the first job or the second job? 
If second job is chosen in the first question, then: Suppose the chances were 50-50 that 
the second job would double your lifetime income, and 50-50 that it would cut it in half. 
Would you take the first job or the second job? 
If second job is chosen in the second question again, then: Suppose the chances were 50-
50 that the second job would double your lifetime income and 50-50 that it would cut it by 
seventy-five percent. Would you take the first job or the second job? 
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